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Abstract

Historically recent changes in the structure of the international system, as a result
of globalization and the related empowerment of transnational actors, have put states at a
disadvantage in dealing with threatening transnational actors. In the past, strong states
could do what they wanted and weak states would obey, but because the fates of strong
states and weak states are tied together in the struggle against transnational threats, it
behooves both parties to seek the most effective solutions. I will test that hypothesis by
observing several cases of strong state cooperation with weak states to confront
transnational threats and categorizing the cases in terms of the degree of weak state input
in policy formulation. The cases considered are: United States and European Union
strategies in confronting the transnational illicit drug trade with Colombia; and United
States and European Union approaches to global terrorism emanating from East African
states. The study found that weak state input did not make a significant difference in
reducing the inflow of drugs into the US or the EU. In fact the US tendency to dominate
in policy planning produced temporary results. On the other hand, these results came at
significant costs in terms of violence and militarism, whereas the EU’s programs tend to
be successful as models focused on social and economic development. The results,
therefore, were mixed.
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Chapter 1: Rationale

Changing global trends have begun to shape a world that connects together the
fortunes and fates of strong and weak states. These globalizing trends have undermined
the traditional strengths of states, such as their monopoly on the legitimate use of force
within their borders, have made them more vulnerable to the forces that link states
together, and have given rise to new forms of transnational actors. Transnational actors
have new power over states, for benevolent, like transnational social movements such as
the movement for human rights,1 and for nefarious purposes, such as transnational
criminal organizations.2 This thesis is interested in transnational actors that threaten
states and the ways in which strong and weak states cooperate to confront them.
More than a decade has passed since the terrorist attacks of September eleventh,
2001 (referred to colloquially as 9/11). Those attacks and the response to them by the
United States inaugurated a new era of world politics. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne
suggest that, “for years to come, if not decades, the ‘war on terrorism’ will be the
defining paradigm in the struggle for global order.”3 In the time that has passed the
world has found that, despite Thucydides’ maxim that the strong do what they will and
the weak do what they must, even the strongest are limited in their ability to confront
threats that transcend state borders. Transnational threats are the defining security issues

1

Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International
Politics, Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press (1998), pp. 8-9.
2
Damien Cave and Ginger Thompson, “U.S. Rethinks a Drug War After Deaths in Honduras,” The New
York Times, web, accessed 5/4/2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/world/americas/in-hondurasdeaths-make-us-rethink-drug-war.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0>, (2012).
3
Ken Booth, and Tim Dunne, eds., Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order, London:
Palgrave (2002), p. ix.
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of our time.4 These are non-traditional security issues that threaten the national security
or economic stability of a state’s society, and are not bounded by the borders of any state.
Transnational threats did not emerge fully formed with the 9/11 attacks. They
have deep historical roots, but have evolved most rapidly during and immediately
following the Cold War-era. The advent of airplane hijackings in the 1970s was the birth
of modern transnational terrorism, according to Bruce Hoffman in his book Inside
Terrorism, because all elements of the act transcended borders. The victims, perpetrators,
and audience of the acts were from and in many different states, and the hijackings
themselves took advantage of the new normal of high-speed international air travel.5
Human-based transnational threats, such as terrorism and transnational crime, have
changed in structurally significant ways since the end of the Cold War, and states are
struggling to catch up.
Globally-oriented terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs)
have evolved in response to the myriad changes taking place in the world. Technological
advances, cultural shifts, rapid industrialization and urbanization in the Global South, and
increasing economic interdependence provided fertile ground for the evolution of an
organizational structure that could confound powerful states. Changes in the
organizational structure of groups that pose threats on a transnational level as well as
changes in the international system coincided to subvert the traditional power of states to
handle these threats unilaterally.

4

Stephen A. Cambone, A New Structure for National Security Policy Planning, Washington, D.C.: CSIS,
Significant Issues Series, XX:3 (1998), p. 49.
5
Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism Revised and Expanded Edition, New York: Columbia University Press
(2006).
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Given these changes in the international system, I am interested in investigating
how powerful states address transnational threats, and how they could do so more
effectively. My assumption is that transnational threats cannot be successfully addressed
by just one state – even if that state is a hegemonic power. If transnational threats are
addressed unilaterally by a state, no matter the power of that state, the strategy will fail.
The opposite contention is not necessarily true – that if transnational threats are addressed
cooperatively, the threat will be successfully addressed. However, I argue that success is
more likely if the threat is confronted through strategies of cooperation.
Weak states tend to seek cooperation with stronger states when dealing with
transnational threats because they lack the resources to take them on alone. Strong states
tend to impose strategy on weaker states when they can, as Thucydides described.
Because today’s security threats transcend state borders, imposed strategies tend to be
unsuccessful. My hypothesis is therefore that the more deeply strong states collaborate
with weak states in developing strategies to confront transnational security issues, the
more likely it is that transnational threats will be effectively addressed. This may even
involve granting weaker states strategic leadership in the identification of appropriate
solutions.

Outline

The argument of this thesis begins by grappling with the question: how can states
better address transnational threats? Transnational threats are at the top of the
international security agenda and they have become a permanent feature in world politics,
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which implies that they are not being countered effectively by states.6 Thus, the
argument of this thesis builds from the premise that the world has changed in significant
ways in recent history, and that transnational actors that pose a threat to states have
adapted to take advantage of those changes. States, on the other hand, have not yet
caught up and are vulnerable to transnational threats. This thesis will explore the United
States and the European Union’s strategic approaches to tackling the problem of TCOs
trafficking in illicit drugs, as well as the problem of preventing terrorist groups from
successfully striking their targets, to illustrate how strong states attempt to cope with
transnational threats. I will give a thorough account of the US and EU’s strategic
approaches to cooperation with Colombia and East Africa, respectively, in my case
studies. Finally, I will conclude with an analysis of the relative success and failure of the
policies and programs resulting from the strategies of cooperation adopted by the strong
states in an attempt to see the degree to which, if at all, variations in weak state input in
policy formulation correlate with variations in the effectiveness of those policies.

Background

Until the 20th Century, transnational issues were not posed as a serious problem
for states. Historically, international politics has been just that: the politics that takes
place among nation-states. From the consolidation of the Westphalian conception of
statehood to the end of the Cold War, international politics was concerned with the

6

Cambone, pp. 49-50.
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relations of war and peace, wealth and poverty between and among states.7 Yet,
transnational issues were not absent from the international agenda. Trafficking in illicit
drugs, for example, has been an issue states have grappled with on the international level
since before even the 1912 Hague Opium Commission.8 However, these issues did not
take center stage, but rather existed in the “penumbra of diplomacy,” often set aside for
the more immediate concerns of power politics.9
Transnational threats gained in prominence on the agenda of international politics
in the 1970s.10 At that time attention turned to the increasing interdependence of states
due to the rise of international institutions, the deepening of the economic and financial
ties between states, and the rise of environmental awareness.11 The rise of terrorism and
drug trafficking gained global attention; in that period, however, they were addressed
within the framework of the Cold War rather than as an independent phenomena.
Terrorism was linked to ongoing conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan,12 and transnational cartels gained material capacity, in terms of
weapons and funding, through the insurgencies and civil wars associated with the Cold
War.13
“Students and practitioners of international politics have traditionally
concentrated their attention on relationships between states,” Robert Keohane and Joseph

7

Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Robert O. Keohane, “Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction,”
International Organization, 25:3 (1971), pp. 329.
8
Mathea Falco, “Foreign Drugs, Foreign Wars,” Daedalus, 121:3 (1992), p. 2.
9
Adam Watson, Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States, New York: Routledge (1984), pp. 111-113.
10
Nye and Keohane, “Transnational Relations,” pp. 329-349.
11
Robert Gilpin, The Challenge of Global Capitalism: The World Economy in the 21st Century, Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press (2002), pp. 3-15, 163-192.
12
Davic C. Rapoport in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies,
States of Mind, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press (1998), pp. 86-102.
13
Falco, pp. 2-6.
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Nye state in the beginning of their 1971 article on transnational relations.14 They go on
to say that the state is the basic unit of action in world politics, agreeing with Hans J.
Morgenthau, Raymond Aron, and Kenneth Waltz, the preeminent realist scholars of that
time.15 They summarize the realist’s view as follows: “Since force, violence, and threats
thereof are at the core of this interplay [of governmental policies that makes up world
politics], the struggle for power, whether as end or necessary means, is the distinguishing
mark of politics among nations.”16 Keohane and Nye go on to critique this view of
international politics, citing the transnational issues that even in the early 1970s were
beginning to creep into the conversation.
Transnational issues gained in importance throughout the Cold War, and became
the defining issues of the post-Cold War world. To demonstrate the change, I can
contrast two books by the international relations scholar Paul Kennedy. In 1987 Kennedy
wrote The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, putting the post-WWII years into
perspective in world history. In it, Kennedy writes of the arc and trajectory of great
powers in broad perspective, demonstrating the importance of economic growth as a
necessary part of international power.17 In his concluding chapters Kennedy argues that
the dynamics of international politics are unlikely to change anytime soon:
The international system, whether it is dominated for a time by six Great
Powers or only two, remains anarchical – that is, there is no greater
authority than the sovereign, egoistical nation-state. In each particular
period of time some of those states are growing or shrinking in their
relative share of secular power. […] In sum, without the intervention of an
act of God, or a disastrous nuclear conflagration, there will continue to be
14

Nye and Keohane, “Transnational Relations,” p. 329.
See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Peace and Power 4th Revised Ed.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf (1967); Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations,
trans. Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox, New York: Frederick A. Praeger (1967); and Kenneth N.
Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, New York: Columbia University Press (1959).
16
Nye and Keohane, “Transnational Relations,” p. 329.
17
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, New York: Random House (1987), pp. 438-439.
15
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a dynamic of world power, essentially driven by technological and
economic change.18
Kennedy is comfortable comparing Charles V’s Habsburg Empire with British hegemony
in the late 1800s and early 1900s, and he predicts not much variation in the future.
In 1992 Kennedy wrote another book, this one titled, Preparing for the 21st
Century. The origins of this book are recounted by the author in his foreword, and they
are worth repeating verbatim:
This book had its origins in a debate which took place between me and a
large group of economists at the Brookings Institution in Washington in
the spring of 1988, and which centered on my newly published work The
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. In the course of a lively evening one
critic- not known to me – declared that he couldn’t understand why such a
fuss was being made about Rise and Fall by everyone. It was, after all, a
very traditional sort of book, focusing upon the nation-state as the central
actor in world affairs. Why hadn’t I used my time better, to write about
much more important and interesting issues, those forces for global
change like population growth, the impact of technology, environmental
damage, and migration, which were transnational in nature and threatened
to affect the lives of us all, peasant as well as premiers?19
As a result of this critique Kennedy began to pay more attention to transnational issues.
He started by collecting newspaper clippings and eventually he wrote a book that focused
entirely on transnational issues. In the years between 1987 and 1993 Kennedy went from
a book that dealt solely with great powers to one that dealt primarily with transnational
issues. In his words, “Regardless of whether the Cold War is over […], there now exist
vast nonmilitary threats to the safety and well-being of the peoples of this planet which
deserve attention.”20 This brief comparison illustrates how one of the preeminent
scholars of international relations noticed a sea change in the issues states would be, and
are now, dealing with.
18

Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, p. 440.
Paul Kennedy. Preparing for the 21st Century. New York: Random House (1993), p. ix.
20
Kennedy, Preparing for the 21st Century, p. 14.
19

10

Stephen Cambone, a scholar with the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, wrote in 1998 that, “a set of threats has emerged that is not of the traditional
variety and whose origin may be abroad but whose impact can be felt in the United States
by US citizens.”21 This definition of transnational threats written for US foreign policy
decision makers captures the essence of the post-Cold War system. Cambone goes on to
state that, “These threats include terrorism, the use of WMD, organized crime (including
drugs), and illegal immigration.”22 For the sake of brevity this thesis will only deal with
global terrorism and transnational crime, but I expect the results of this study to be
generalizable to such issues as weapons of mass destruction proliferation and climate
change.
The world system has changed, and transnational actors have evolved to take
advantage of those changes. At the same time, those changes weaken states relative to
transnational actors. The most tangible manifestation of the abstract concept of
sovereignty is a state’s borders. The lines between states are marked by signs, gates,
walls, flags, and sometimes armed guards. Nowhere except, perhaps, a nation’s capital is
sovereignty so evident.23 Borders, however, are a double-edged blade for states because
their very existence gives an advantage to transnational networks. They give international
criminals and violent groups places to hide. They make illicit smugglers rich by raising
the price of illicit goods. Moisés Naím, former editor of Foreign Policy, makes this point
in his book on modern trends in transnational criminal organizations, Illicit:
For criminals, frontiers create business opportunities and convenient
shields. But for the government officials chasing the criminals, borders are
often insurmountable obstacles. The privileges of national sovereignty are
21

Cambone, p. 49.
Ibid.
23
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities Revised Edition, New York: Verso (2006), p. 7.
22
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turning into burdens and constraints on governments. Because of this
asymmetry, in the global clash between governments and criminals,
governments are systematically losing.24
Borders benefit criminals by protecting criminals from retaliation and raising their
profits, and they limit states’ ability to address transnational issues because of the limited
jurisdiction of a state’s legitimate use of force.

Importance

In the twelve years since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, many
scholars have written about transnational threats.25 They have focused on the structure of
terrorist cells, counterterrorism tactics, international legal frameworks, and the historical
evolution of the threat.26 They have noted that the evolving structure of transnational
threats, like terror and crime, combined with the changing international system, has
handicapped states vis-à-vis these non-state actors. There is, however, a gap in the
literature with respect to the role of cooperation between strong and weak states in
confronting transnational threats. This thesis enters into that open territory and attempts
to provide a preliminary glance at the trends and correlations involved in confronting
transnational threats.

24

Mosés Naím, Illicit. New York: Random House (2005), p. 13.
From Thomas Friedman, an author for popular audiences who wrote the bestselling The World is Flat: A
Brief History of the Twenty-First Century, New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux (2005), to the policyoriented Stuart Gottlieb ed., Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Conflicting Perspectives on
Causes, Contexts, and Responses, Washington, D.C.: CQ Press (2009), to the academic Ken Booth, and
Tim Dunne, eds. Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order. London: Palgrave (2002).
26
See Stuart Gottlieb, Debating Terrorism, Moises Naim, Illicit, Walter Reich, The Origins of Terrorism:
Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press
(1998), Charlotte Ku and Paul F. Diehl, International Law: Classic and Contemporary Readins, Boulder,
CO: Lynne Reinner (2008), etc.
25
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Chapter 2: Research design

States have been struggling with the problem of transnational threats since before
the end of the Cold War with little to show for their efforts. The world entered a
“unipolar moment” when the Cold War ended, leaving the United States the sole
superpower.1 Even as the most powerful state in the world, the US has not effectively
addressed transnational threats like terrorist groups and transnational criminal
organizations (TCOs). This thesis attempts to grapple with the question of how strong
states can better confront these non-traditional security issues. Building on the current
literature in the field, this thesis seeks the answer to that question in the ways in which
strong and weak states cooperate to confront transnational threats.
History tells us that stronger states prefer to maintain the upper hand, often to the
point of resorting to coercive methods, vis-à-vis weaker states with regard to security
issues.2 Recent changes in the international system have combined to create a global
reality that puts states – strong and weak – at a disadvantage when dealing with
transnational threats. In order to address transnational issues, states must cooperate.
Weak states are often most affected and involved in those issues, so it stands to reason
that those states ought to play a pivotal role in resolving them. If strong states develop
strategies to address transnational threats more cooperatively, including, if need be,

1

Michael Mastanduno and Ethan Kapstein, Eds., Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the
Cold War, New York: Columbia University Press (1999), pp. 1-27.
2
M.J. Balogun, Hegemony and Sovereign Equality: The Interest Contiguity Theory in International
Relations, London: Springer (2011), pp. 73-74.
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granting weaker states strategic leadership in the search for effective solutions, threats
will be more successfully addressed.

Methodology

In order to test this hypothesis I will attempt to describe and classify, in a small
sample of cases, the strategies of cooperation strong states employ to deal with
transnational threats along a spectrum of weak state input. Following that classification I
will demonstrate the relative success or failure of the policies and programs employed in
those cases. The independent variable in this study is the degree of weak state input in
the formation of strategies to confront transnational threats, and the dependent variable is
the degree of success of those strategies in addressing transnational threats. If my
hypothesis is correct, we would expect strategies with a higher degree of weak state input
succeeding against transnational threats at a higher rate than strategies with a lower
degree of weak state input.
Due to space constraints, this thesis will be limited to two primary case studies,
divided into four sub-cases. The first case will compare and contrast the United States
and the European Union’s approaches to handling transnational crime, in this case drug
trafficking, with Colombia from the late 1990s to 2012. The second case will similarly
compare and contrast the US and EU’s strategic approaches, this time in relation to
counterterrorism efforts in a post-9/11 world in East Africa. This study will consider the
EU as a state for two reasons. First, its relative size and economic strength make it one of
the most powerful international actors on the world scene. This allows for comparison

14

between the case studies that will follow. Second, the Maastricht Treaty states that the
EU will form a common foreign and security policy, including a common defense
policy.3
In order to evaluate the relative success of each case, I will categorize the
strategies of cooperation employed by strong states along a spectrum from strong state
imposition to weak state strategic leadership. In Table 1, below, I lay out the five
primary strong state strategies. These strategies are placed on a spectrum from no or
limited weak state input (at the top of the table) to weak state strategic leadership (at the
bottom). At the top of the table are the least desirable strategies, in terms of this paper’s
hypothesis, and at the bottom are the most desirable.
Table 1: Strong State Strategies of Cooperation

1

Strong state imposes its will

2

Strong state dominates, weak state concurs

3

Strong state crafts policy with weak state input – possibly through multilateral
institutions

4

Strong and weak states participate equally in policymaking

5

Weak state leads in policymaking

In this thesis I will categorize the cases using the following methodology.
When the weak state is not given the opportunity to provide input or is ignored in
strategic deliberations, or when the strong state does not consult with the weak state
before providing a fully fledged strategy, I classify the case as one of a strong state

3

“Treaty of Maastricht,” European Union, Official Journal of the European Communities, C 325/5; web,
accessed 5/4/2014, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b39218.html>, (1992).
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imposition (1). In these cases, one might see the small state balk at implementing the
specifics of the strategy despite having nominally accepted the strategy.
When the strong state dominates in the formulation of a strategy to address a
transnational problem, but the weak state approves of that strategy (2), one would expect
to see a small amount of consultation with the weak state during the formulation process.
This strategy fits within the dependency theory literature that finds that weak states side
with strong states not because of force, but because of shared values between elites in
both states.4 Thus, weak state input in the formulation of strategy, should it occur at all,
would take place at the elite level, and might be protested by other segments of the weak
state’s society. The assumption here is that the elites in both the weak and strong states
agree on the problem and the solution, and one would see indications of this in the public
statements made by the weak and strong states.
When the strong state crafts the strategy with weak state input (3), one would
expect to see substantive weak state input. Indications of this would be if the primary
weak state strategic goals were adopted in the final strategy, but the majority of the
strategic debate took place in the strong state; also there would be high-level meetings
between weak and strong state representatives. Another indicator might be if the
strategic negotiation took place in a multilateral institution such as the United Nations.
While hegemonic stability theory, described in more detail below, posits that the
hegemon, or strongest power in a given region or international system, sets up
international institutions in order to preserve and codify the existing balance of power,
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye argue that the UN gives weaker states more power vis4

Jacqueline Anne Braveboy-Wagner, “The Foreign Policies of the Global South: An Introduction.” In
Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, ed., The Foreign Policies of the Global South, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner
(2003), pp. 24-25.
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à-vis strong states in negotiations, because of the principle of one state, one vote.5
Keohane and Nye refer primarily to the General Assembly of the UN, where Global
South states have banded together to defeat some policies endorsed by stronger states,6
although any strategy that includes force is the prerogative of the Security Council, in
which the P-57 states have veto power. Regardless, strong and weak state strategic
negotiations that take place within international institutions will evince more input from
the weak state than negotiations that take place solely in the strong state.
When strategy formulation takes place in both the strong and the weak state, when
significant weak state proposals end up in the final strategy, and when most or all of the
strategic provisions are debated by the weak state legislature, then the participation in
strategy formulation can be seen as roughly equal (4). The location of strategy
formulation is important because the process of implementing strategy requires
mobilization on the part of both states, but just as the weak state is usually more impacted
by the transnational issue, so too will it be more impacted by the strategy to confront it.
Strategy formation that takes place in a weak state will likely include more
representatives of the agencies and organizations directly involved in implementing the
strategy, giving them a larger voice and stake in the proceedings. As stated above, the
closeness of the final strategy decided upon to the original proposal of the weak state
should indicate the degree of weak state input. Finally, the domestication of international
legal provisions (be they bilateral, multilateral, regional, or global) in terms of legislation
passed can serve as a reliable indicator of a national government’s acceptance of a

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence 3rd Ed. New York: Longman (2001), pp.
307-318.
6
Braveboy-Wagner, pp. 1-7.
7
The US, the UK, France, Russia, and China.
5
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strategy. Beth Elise Whitaker, an international relations scholar, uses domestication of
international legal provisions – or the lack thereof – to measure compliance with the USled counterterrorism regime among weak African states.8
Weak state strategic leadership (5) can be said to have occurred in cases where
one observes the strategy formation process take place inside the weak state; all weak
state provisions are included in the final strategy; and all strategic provisions are codified
by the weak state. Weak state strategic leadership can take place in an international
institution or in a neutral state, but that is usually a part of a more domestic process.
In sum, the breakdown of strategies and indicators is as follows:










(1) Strong state imposes its will
o Low or no weak state input
 Few high-level meetings
 Few weak state priorities maintained in final strategy
o Lack of weak state domestication of strategic provisions
(2) Strong state dominates, weak state concurs
o Low to mid weak state input
 Some high-level meetings with weak state elites
 Some weak state priorities maintained in final strategy
o Civil society in weak state may object
(3) Strong state crafts strategy with weak state input
o Relatively substantial weak state input
 Many high-level meetings
 Primary weak state priorities maintained in final strategy
o Strategic debate takes place primarily in the strong state
o Strategic debate can take place in international organization
(4) Strong and weak states participate equally
o Substantial weak state input
 Many high-level meetings
 Most weak state priorities maintained in final strategy
o Strategy formation takes place in both the strong and the weak state
o High degree of domestication of strategic provisions
(5) Weak state leadership
o Some strong state input
o Strategy formation takes place in the weak state

8

Beth Elise Whitaker, “Compliance Among Weak States: Africa and the Counterterrorism Regime,”
Review of International Studies 36:3 (2010), pp. 650-660.
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o All weak state goals and priorities maintained in final strategy
o All strategic provisions domesticated in weak state
Using this methodology, at the end of each case I will match the case to the strategy of
cooperation utilized by the US and the EU to confront transnational threats, specifically
trafficking in illicit drugs and global terrorism.
The dependent variable, the degree of success to both parties of the policies and
programs that are the outcomes of the cooperation between the strong and weak state,
will be measured as follows: in terms of transnational crime, success is measured by
reductions in drug flows into the strong state, as well as by a decline in drug-related
crime in the target country. In terms of terrorism, success will be measured by a decline
in the rate of terrorist incidents in the weak state, in the strong state by organizations
based in or linked to the weak state, and against strong state targets in the weak state.
Both metrics of success will be judged in relation to the introduction of the policy or
program, keeping in mind that most policies take at least a year to begin to have an effect,
so in tables and graphs depicting the metric of success over time we would expect to see
success increasing as the policy or program took effect.
Success against transnational crime, meaning, in this study, drug trafficking,
presents a difficult challenge for measurement. Successful crime is, by its clandestine
nature, not reported. Variables in analyses of real world events seek to be reliable, in that
they are consistent metrics, and valid, in that they measure the phenomenon they purport
to measure. Governments and news organizations seeking to measure trends in
transnational crime tend to focus on variables that are conveniently and reliably measured,
but that are not necessarily valid. For example, the US government sets goals regarding
the reduction of hectares of ground dedicated to the production of coca, and of tons of

19

cocaine interdicted.9 These goals are premised on the assumption that there is a fixed
amount of cocaine being trafficked and that by interdicting the cocaine or defoliating the
crop, the inflow of illicit drugs into the US will decrease.10 Unfortunately, that
assumption is flawed, as is discussed below in chapter three, and measuring the amount
of coca bush defoliated or of cocaine interdicted does not, on its own, tell us anything
about the flow of cocaine into the US. In this thesis I will estimate the success of the
policies and programs enacted through cooperation between strong and weak states with
two metrics that get at the goals of the strong and weak states. The virtue of using two
different proxy variables in this case is that it more accurately measures success for both
parties. Strong and weak states have different goals regarding transnational crime.
The first metric, which seeks to measure the aspect of transnational crime that
strong states are most effected by – drug inflows, is estimates of illicit drugs entering the
strong state. A valid estimate of the flow of cocaine into a state is the fluctuation in the
price of cocaine in that state. The principle of supply and demand tells us that when
demand outstrips supply, prices go up, and when supply outstrips demand, prices go
down. Demand for cocaine in both the US and the EU has remained relatively stable in
the time period of this study, and fluctuations are taken into account in the analysis.11
The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) provides street cocaine prices
by purity level going back to 1990.12 I will use this data to analyze the success of the
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policies and programs enacted by the US and EU by observing the fluctuation in price,
and therefore supply, over time. This is similar to the Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP) composite estimate of illicit drug flows into the US.13
Violence is the main problem associated with transnational crime for weak states.
The rate of violence is a valid metric of the instability of a state.14 In this thesis I make
the assumption that state stability and TCO strength have a zero-sum relationship,
meaning that as a state becomes more unstable, TCOs grow stronger. This assumption is
based off of a tradition in the literature that says that, “as state authority weakens and
fails, [...] so lawlessness becomes more apparent. Criminal gangs take over the streets of
the cities. Arms and drug trafficking become more apparent.”15 The second metric I use
to evaluate the success or failure of the policies and programs described in the cases
below gets at the threat TCOs pose to the stability of weak states – rates of violence. The
UNODC offers the public a comprehensive database that includes homicide rates and the
rates of violent crime linked to gangs and criminal organizations.16 I will use this data,
along with data that shows the rate of violence in various parts of the country and battlerelated deaths, to measure the degree of success or failure of the policies arrived at by
cooperation between the US and Colombia and the EU and Colombia in diminishing the
strength of TCOs and other armed groups beholden to the drug trade.
Success against global terrorism is comparatively easier to measure, because the
problem of global terrorism for strong and weak states alike is the frequency and intensity
13
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of terrorist incidents. For measuring the rise and fall of incidents of global terrorism the
Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is a freely available database made available to the
public by the University of Maryland. The database draws from over 25,000 news
sources, and covers a period of time stretching from the advent of modern terrorism to
2012.17 This study will not use terrorist incidents reportedly stopped by governments, as
this data is necessarily incomplete and subjectively reported.
In each case study, chapters four and five, I will categorize the cooperative
strategies of the strong states according to the degree of weak state input in the formation
of policies and programs to confront transnational threats. In the analysis portion of this
thesis, chapter six, I will discuss the success or failure of those policies and programs,
and I will compare the degree of weak state input against the success or failure of those
policies and programs. Assuming the evidence supports my hypothesis, this analysis will
demonstrate a positive correlation between the depth of strong state strategic cooperation
with weak states, especially to the point of weak state strategic leadership, and the
success of the policies employed against transnational threats.

Definitions

The concept of transnationalism is intrinsically tied to globalization.
Globalization, the historically recent phenomenon characterized by overlapping
economic, technological, cultural, social, and political processes connecting states and
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societies to one another at multiple levels, has changed the world system.18 This
phenomenon has tied states closer together through deepened economic interdependence
and political integration so that gains and losses are more dependent on others; it has
connected individuals and networks through; it has provided fertile ground for an
explosion in the quantity and capacity of non-state actors, both violent and non-violent; it
has increased the crossing of borders as trade, migration, crime, and labor increase
between nations; and it has decreased the frequency of conflict between states while
increasing the frequency of conflict within and across states.19 These changes highlight
the two trends that compose the concept of transnationalism: people and peoples connect
more and more frequently on individual, group, and network levels all over the world;
and more people, goods, money, and even ideas flow across state borders. As a result,
the lots of states of different strength and weakness are connected. There are many
positive effects of a more interconnected world, such as increased trade and decreased
interstate conflict, but this more interconnected world has also led to the development of
new threats.20 Transnational threats, like globally-oriented terrorism and transnational
crime, take advantage of the changes in the international system in ways make it
impossible for a single state to confront them. Transnational criminal organizations
(TCOs) are organizations whose operations span states and whose purpose is to obtain
power, influence, or financial gains by illegal means.21 Globally-oriented terrorist groups
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are groups whose operations span states and whose purpose is to influence states and
provoke a large-scale confrontation by violently and indiscriminately attacking people
and symbols associated with their enemies.22 These are the transnational threats I will
deal with below.
In this thesis I will discuss strong and weak states, and it will clarify my argument
considerably to have a clear definition of what they are. Weak states, for the purposes of
this paper, are states considered to be in the Global South. Global south is a term that
refers to what was once known as the Third World during the Cold War. Global south
states make up approximately two-thirds of all states in the global community and are
predominantly located in Asia, Latin America, and Africa.23 The main characteristics
these states share is lower levels of development relative to the Global North; most are
multiethnic and many are dealing with governance problems. They are militarily weak
vis-à-vis the North.24
Strong states, on the other hand, are generally richer, more developed states.
They tend to be in the northern hemisphere, though not exclusively, and many of them
share powerful positions in the world’s largest international organizations, like the United
Nations Security Council and the Group of 8 (G8).25
Weak states are more affected by transnational issues than larger states. Much
like trees in a flood, the larger the tree, the less the current damages it. Weak states bend
and threaten to fall under the weight of transnational issues. Terrorism provides an
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illustrative example. The US lost fewer than 3,000 people in the 9/11 attacks, and the
state apparatus itself was mostly unharmed by the attack.26 Afghanistan,27 Yemen,28 and
Mali,29 have been completely destabilized by the influence of al-Qaeda and their allies
and affiliates. Countless lives have been lost and the states themselves have been
compromised by the influence of transnational terrorism and the efforts to combat it.
Because these states are small not just on the international stage, but also tend to have
less ability to project power domestically, they make excellent breeding grounds for
borderless groups seeking to avoid notice.30 Transnational problems such as terrorism
and crime disproportionately affect weak states in part because they are often hosts,
willing or no, to those groups.31 Other reasons for the tendency of transnational problems
to hurt weak states more than strong states are weak states’ vulnerability to fluctuations in
the international economy, their dependence on conditional foreign aid, and their weak
control over the use of force within their borders.32
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There are three dominant approaches to the question of the utility and
effectiveness of cooperation: realism, liberalism, and constructivism and critical
approaches. I intend to use the literature from all three major traditions in the
international relations literature to build a foundation for this thesis. Realism, liberalism,
their variants, and those theorists that critique them are tools that can be used to better
understand international relations.
The dominant theoretical tradition in international relations has historically been
realism. Realist theorists begin from the premise that states are the key actors on the
international stage. States, or state leaders, are actors that behave rationally, and their
primary interest is the maximization of their own security or power, depending on the
specific subspecies of realism.33 The primary variants of realism are classical, defensive,
and offensive realism. The foundational assumption of the realist ontology is that states
are formally equal units in an anarchical international system. Knowledge is always
incomplete, so the intentions of another state can never be known for certain. Trust, then,
is in short supply, so states must rely upon themselves for their own security in a
condition known as “self-help.”34
Classical realism asserts that the roots of the anarchical international system can
be traced to human nature. Man is driven to conflict by nature, and in the absence of
hierarchy man will exist in a Hobbesian war of all against all.35 In classical realism,
human beings make decisions and they do so to maximize power.36 E.H. Carr’s The
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Twenty Years’ Crisis and Hans Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations are two of the
definitive works in the tradition of classical realism. Classical realists argue that state
leaders choose to cooperate primarily to maintain a balance of power.
Structural realism raises the level of analysis from the level of the individual to
the level of the structure of the international system. The basic tenets of structural
realism are similar to the ontological foundations of classical realism: the state is the
primary actor in world politics; states are unitary, rational actors; and the international
system is anarchical. Both branches of realism primarily study great powers, and neglect
the Global South. Security issues are at the top of the agenda for all realists. However,
structural realists argue that states are concerned with survival more than power, and that
states can only help themselves. Defensive and offensive realism are both variants of
structural realism.37
Kenneth Waltz was one of the first theorists to put forth a structural theory of
international relations. In his seminal work, Theory of International Politics, he draws
heavily from behavioral economics to argue that state behavior is primarily a function of
the structure of the international system. Termed “neo-realism,” this sub-branch of
realism argues that the balance of power is actually a systemic feature of international
politics because states are concerned not with the maximization of their own power, but
with gaining more security. This foundational belief is the basic premise of defensive
realism. Security, Waltz argues, is a zero-sum feature of world politics, so all gains
(military, economic, social, diplomatic, etc.) are made in comparison to other states – not
in a vacuum. Waltz proposes that states’ concern for their own security, the relative
nature of all gains, and the lack of trust in an anarchical international system leads to a
37
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spiral model, or security dilemma.38 However, a feature of the international system is
that any change in the distribution of capabilities in the international system affects the
relative gains of every state, provoking a balancing coalition.39 Cooperation, therefore,
occurs naturally in reaction to changes in the distribution of capabilities in the
international system.
Stephen Walt modifies Waltz’s defensive realism, arguing instead that states
cooperate by forming balancing coalitions in opposition to threats. Relative gains alone
are not what provoke balancing coalitions – cooperation occurs in the face of fear. Walt
expands defensive realism’s concept of alliance formation and cooperation with The
Origins of Alliances. In it he proves that states tend to balance against states they
perceive as threatening: “External threats are the most frequent cause of international
alliances.”40 Threat, for Walt, is measured in terms of geographic proximity, aggregate
power, offensive capabilities, and intentions. These factors bring the human dimension
back into structural realism, making cooperation a decision rather than a natural feature
of the international system. Walt is important to this study not only for his contributions
to defensive realism, but because he studied weak states in a theoretical school that
marginalizes and ignores all but the great powers; 41 and the hypothesis of this thesis
depends on the fact that states will form balancing coalitions against what they perceive
to be threats.
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Offensive realism, a structural realist theory, similarly begins with the foundation
that states, and primarily great powers, are the key actors in world politics; states are
unitary, rational actors; the international system is anarchical; there is a lack of trust in
the international system; and states desire security. John Mearshimer, a prominent
offensive realist, argues that Waltz’s theory of international politics is biased toward the
preservation of the status quo. Defensive realists, according to Mearsheimer, believe that
states seek only enough security to maintain the balance of power. Offensive realism, on
the other hand, does not believe states stop gaining security after they reach a balance of
power. Rather, offensive realists believe that states are power-maximizing actors quick
to resort to offensive action to increase their security: “The greater the military advantage
one state has over other states, the more secure it is.”42 For Mearsheimer, anarchy and
relative gains provoke a spiral model of fear for survival, and rather than there being a
natural balancing impulse in the international system, states “look for opportunities to
alter the balance of power by acquiring additional increments of power at the expense of
potential rivals.”43 States do not seek a balance of power, they seek hegemony. More
important than military gains, however, is self-help. Interdependence is an
uncomfortable reality for states to endure because it undermines self-help. In an
anarchical system, depending on other unknowable potentially threatening states makes
you vulnerable to attack or exploitation.44 Cooperation is an extremely fraught concept
for offensive realists.
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Hegemonic stability theory, a realist theory that argues that a state with a
preponderance of power facilitates peaceful cooperation and effectively addresses
international problems, borrows heavily from offensive realism. In fact, Mearsheimer
supports this theory in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics when he argues that states
struggling to maximize security will attempt to install themselves as regional or global
hegemons, shaping the international system to their benefit.45 In hegemonic stability
theory the hegemon stabilizes the world system by solving common goods problems,
setting global norms and rules, controlling key resources, establishing international
institutions to codify the existing order, and promoting its own culture as the international
culture.46 Cooperation occurs through the leadership of the hegemon: “Leadership
provided by hegemonic states is understood as facilitating achievement of collaboration
among states.”47 In an anarchical world with functionally equal actors devoid of trust,
international cooperation facilitated when incentives are given (and disincentives are
threatened) by a state vastly more powerful than the rest. Hegemonic stability theory
predicts that the world’s current superpower, the United States in today’s terms, and the
organizations, norms, regimes, and laws it has helped to form, will lead the world in
confronting transnational problems. Realist theory contains the null hypothesis for this
thesis – increased cooperation with weak states does not better address transnational
issues. Hegemonic stability theory predicts that strong state dictation of the terms of
cooperation and strategy will be more effective.
Liberal theorists believe that states, as well as non-state actors like international
organizations, multinational corporations, and transnational criminal groups, are
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important in world politics. States, organizations, NGOs, TCOs, and other international
actors are enmeshed in a complex web of politics. The agenda of world politics is not
necessarily hierarchical with security matters paramount, in the liberal view economic,
social, and environmental issues are equally significant issue areas. Liberal theorists
disaggregate the state, looking behind the black box of the state to see what makes states
act the way they do. Finally, they tend to orient their research agenda around discovering
what conditions cause, or at least facilitate, international cooperation.48
Liberal theorists believe that democracy, interdependence, and globalization
increase peaceful outcomes in international politics.49 Bruce Russett and John Oneal
draw from Kant, one of the historical contributors to liberalism in international relations
theory, in their book, Triangulating Peace, by arguing that democracy, international
organizations, and economic interdependence substantially increase the likelihood of
international peace.50 They write that as the economic activities of citizens become more
globalized, as they make states more interdependent, states will create laws and
institutions to facilitate those activities. The system of laws and institutions thus created
then further encourages the deepening of economic interdependence. Russett and Oneal
argue that those factors, along with high levels of democracy, correlate strongly with
reduced levels of conflict. Democracy is included for the Kantian reason that because
publics are most detrimentally affected by war, when publics have a say in the decision to
go to war, they are less likely to choose to do so – especially when their incomes are tied
to that of the other state, as is increasingly the case due to economic interdependence.51

48

Viotti and Kaupi, pp. 129-130.
Ibid, pp. 129-135.
50
Bruce Russett and John R. Oneal, Triangulating Peace, New York: W.W. Norton & Co. (2001), pp. 157.
51
Russett and Oneal, pp. 157-179.
49

31

The liberal tradition of thought accepts and encourages the current trend of globalization
and deepening interdependence, believing that these forces bring with them peace and
prosperity. As discussed above, levels of interstate conflict have indeed dropped as states
have become more interconnected. This thesis takes the democratic proposition of
Russett and Oneal’s argument further, arguing that the inclusion of publics closest to the
problems caused by transnational threats in the formulation of policies to confront those
threats will lead to more successful policies. Just as Russett and Oneal argue that
democracy helps to cause peace because it includes in policymaking those who are most
affected by the consequences of the decision, so to do I argue that the inclusion of weak
states in the formulation of strategies helps to more effectively address transnational
threats for the same reason. Of course, domestic and international policymaking are two
different processes, and Russett and Oneal’s argument regarding democracy contains
more nuance than the simplified version I have presented above, but the factors they find
causal have not been accepted uncritically as they are the factors being tested in the cases
below.
Andrew Moravcsik puts forth a liberal theory of international relations that rests
on the three assumptions: (1) the actors in international relations are individuals and
private groups who tend to be rational and act to maximize material and ideal welfare; (2)
state preferences are determined by some subset(s) of domestic society; and (3) state
behavior is constrained by the configuration of interdependent state preferences. The
implication of the first two assumptions is that states do not automatically maximize
fixed conceptions of security, sovereignty, or wealth. Rather they pursue particular
interpretations and combinations of security, welfare, and sovereignty preferred by
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powerful domestic groups. Moravcsik upends the realist conception of power based on
state capabilities when he states that, “the willingness of states to expend resources or
make concessions is itself primarily a function of preferences, not capabilities.”52 Hence
his final assumption, that state behavior is constrained by the pattern of policy
interdependence, means that while states attempt to do what they want in international
politics, the state with a more intense interest tends to get what they want relative to
others.53 Cooperation, for Moravcsik, is a product of the pattern of interdependent state
preferences. States cooperate when their preferences align, or when they must in order to
accomplish a common goal. States are less afraid of relative gains because they are not
the atomistic billiard balls realists assume they are. States may instead gain in absolute
terms, cooperation playing the role of the tide that lifts all ships. The condition of
anarchy itself is different for Moravcsik. States are embedded in their own domestic
society and the larger transnational society. States do not act, they are used by small
groups of individuals in positions of power for particular definitions of interests. They
are bounded domestically, by their own disaggregation, and internationally, by the web of
interdependence that characterizes the international stage for Moravcsik.54
A different variant of liberalism looks more closely at the role of institutions in
facilitating cooperation than at domestic political preferences. Robert Axelrod’s The
Evolution of Cooperation uses a game theoretic model to show how institutions that
iterate interactions can give incentives to cooperating states and punish those who do not
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cooperate.55 Axelrod’s work supports the categorization in this thesis’s methodology of
international organizations as sites of increased cooperation, though he does not address
the effect of strength imbalances in states on cooperation.
A neoliberal theory of international cooperation comes from Robert Keohane and
Joseph Nye. Their theory is closer to realism than Moravcsik’s in that it accepts the
analytical necessity of power in determining causality in international relations. In 1977
they published Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, and in it they
laid out the concept of complex interdependence:
Its hallmarks are (1) multiple channels of diplomatic interaction, by all
types of actors, (2) absence of hierarchy on issues (that is, security issues
do not dominate the global or bilateral agenda, and many issues arise from
domestic sources), and (3) irrelevance of military force in determining the
outcomes of bargaining and conflicts.56
Similar to Moravcsik, the actors in international politics for Keohane and Nye are not just
states, but also individuals and groups, and security is not the only issue on the table.
Gains made by states may be absolute. Cooperation is more likely because states are
disaggregated and interdependent. Keohane and Nye make the point that while weak
states may depend on strong states for many things; strong states also depend on weak
states.57
Under situations of complex interdependence conflict is rare because states are so
closely intertwined by multiple points of dependence that aggression on the part of one
state would hurt itself. Cooperation is the natural state for relations between two states
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related by complex interdependence. Keohane and Nye are not saying that states will
tend towards this kind of relationship naturally, and they allow for the possibility that
states will continue to strive for hegemony. Complex interdependence is a phenomenon
these two scholars observed emerging between some states in the 1970s, and the trend
towards greater interdependence has only increased.58
Liberalism recommends that states cooperate through international institutions to
confront transnational threats, utilizing the power of iterated cooperation and the benefits
of interdependence to confront actors that transcend borders. Liberalism is useful for this
study because it widens the scope of theory to include non-state groups, international
organizations, and international regimes as actors in world politics, all of which are
instrumental in the cases below. Also, it helps to provide a foundation for my hypothesis
by arguing that as policymaking is brought closer to those most affected by a problem,
that policymaking will be more effective. Liberalism’s foundational underpinnings allow
for more and stronger cooperation between states, as gains are not necessarily absolute
and security is not always at the top of the agenda of world politics. The perspective of
liberalism is important for this study because it highlights the growing role of
transnational groups and processes and interdependence in shaping the world.
Constructivism and critical approaches to international relations theory have a
different approach. Constructivists challenge the basic ontology of realism and liberalism,
arguing that the world is not given, but made. Norms, ideas, discourse, and history all
play a much larger role in constructivism than they do in realism or liberalism. Critial
theorists, like postcolonial theorists point out the degree of hierarchy embedded in the
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international system, while constructivists argue for the power of norms, words, and ideas
in shaping the political system.59
Interdependence and the growing trend of transnationalism are not just negative
or positive processes. They have uneven benefits and detriments to different states.
Keohane and Nye’s concept of complex interdependence provides insight on how strong
states may be linked to weak states. In fact, they argue that weak states are empowered
in situations of complex interdependence because their domestic interests are less
complex than those of large states.60 This observation is in accordance with critical
theorists who study the interplay between weak and strong states in world politics.
Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner and Michael Snarr argue that as the world is drawn
closer together, weaker states have more power vis-à-vis larger states because they have
solidarity of purpose. The Global South, the current term for the large group of states
located primarily in the southern hemisphere with a common post-colonial history, have
tended to act together on the international stage. Keohane and Nye go on to argue that
the strategy of solidarity in the Global South has been developed at international
conferences, often under the auspices of the UN. The UN’s largest organ, the General
Assembly (GA), tends to favor small states because of the practice of “one state-one
vote.” Keohane and Nye argue that the GA has agenda-setting power on the international
stage, and international organizations like the UN may act as catalysts for coalition
formation and as arenas for political initiatives. Weak states, in their view, have an
enormous advantage in a world where complex interdependence is increasingly common,
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states tend towards interdependence, and international organizations are plentiful and
powerful, compared to times past.61
Most states are weak states. The Global South makes up about two-thirds of the
global community of states.62 Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, in her introduction to The
Foreign Policies of the Global South, looks at small state foreign policymaking at the
state, regional, and Global South units of analysis. She concludes that while there is
much that continues to unite the countries of the Global South, the heyday of their
solidarity, under the Non-Aligned Movement, passed with the end of the Cold War.
States in the global south act as a single unit less than they did before. In addition, the
rise of middle powers like Brazil and India has stratified the global south and made the
grouping itself less coherent. Regional integration has tended to favor intergovernmentalism rather than EU-style supra-nationalism. National strategies vary,
therefore, among global south countries. The regional and Global South levels remain
important contextualizing factors, but the primary level of foreign policy formation is the
domestic for small as well as large states.63
Critical theory lends much to this thesis, especially the importance of weak states
to world politics. Constructivism adds the power of ideas, norms, and words to
international relations, a consequence of its ontological foundation that holds that the
world is made rather than given. The influence of constructivist thought on this thesis is
demonstrated in the methodology, where words and ideas are the primary way I
categorize the strategies of cooperation strong states use. Martha Finnemore, in her

61

Keohane and Nye, “Transnational Relations and World Politics,” International Organization, 25:3
(1971), pp. 307-318.
62
Braveboy-Wagner, p. 1.
63
Ibid, 1-7.

37

seminal work National Interests in International Society, argues that communicative acts
are the primary means by which ideas become norms.64 Norms are important in the
constructivist ontology because, for constructivists, outcomes in international politics are
not caused by the structure of the international system and calculations of power. Rather,
people make decisions, and those decisions are influenced by decision-makers’ prejudice,
opinions, and frames, all of which exist in a dynamic relationship with the norms, history,
and social systems that surround and immerse us all.65 The communicative interactions
that take place during strategy formation are, according to constructivism, critically
important to the outcomes of those negotiations.
This thesis draws from realism, liberalism, constructivism, and critical theory.
All of these theoretical approaches help to ground the hypothesis, rationale, and
methodology of this thesis. Realist theory contains the most direct counterargument
against my hypothesis. While I propose that strong states would be more effective in
their attempts to confront transnational threats if they were to allow for more weak state
input, especially to the point of weak state leadership, hegemonic stability theory argues
that strong states would be more effective if they were to impose strategy upon weak
states. The cases and analysis that follow will see which approach more accurately
describes the world. Before that, however, the next chapter will explore the context of
this thesis in more detail.
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Chapter 3: Introduction to Transnational Threats – Crime and Terrorism

In the introduction to a 2009 Brookings Institution publication, Javier Solana
wrote that non-state actors have evolved much more rapidly than states’ ability to
confront them:
It is clear that globalization remains the dominant trend shaping our world.
It has offered millions a chance to live better lives. But globalization has
also unleashed forces that governments can neither stop nor control on
their own. The list of problems is by now familiar. The “dark side” of
globalization requires us to address climate change, nonproliferation, state
failure, energy security, and financial instability. In recent years, all these
problems have become more urgent and complex. But our capacity to
address them has not kept pace.1
This chapter will explore how two of the main human-based transnational threats,
transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and global terrorist groups, have evolved to
take advantage of the changing world, and how those changes subvert the power of the
state.

The Growth of Transnational Criminal Organizations

Although transnational criminal organizations obtain their revenue streams
through a variety of methods, for this study I will focus on the smuggling of illicit
narcotics, specifically cocaine, because of its centrality to the Colombian case. “People
of every generation have needed chemicals to cope with life: sobriety is not an easy state
1
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for human beings,”2 says Richard Davenport-Hines in his history of narcotics, In Pursuit
of Oblivion. Drug use has been a part of the human experience since before even ancient
Sumerians cultivated opium in what is now Iraq.3 Anyone who has lived with addiction
or addicts can testify to the damage drug addiction can wreak on individuals, but what
makes drugs a transnational issue is not the substances in and of themselves. Rather, the
problem of transnational crime is the harm and violence is done by transnational criminal
organizations (TCOs), huge, complex organizations of networked individuals working
toward a common goal, and the damage done by states in their efforts to disrupt the flow
of drugs through their borders.
David Campbell argues that issues in foreign policy are defined as dangerous by
people for a reason, not because things are dangerous in and of themselves. Foreign
policy making is identity making, according to Campbell. It is deciding what we are and
what we are not, and what we are not is what we must fight against.4 Why then is the
production and trafficking of cocaine a security problem for states strong and weak?
Drug production, trafficking, and use did not become a problem of international affairs
until the Anglo-Chinese Opium Wars of the mid-1800s. The Opium Wars (1839-1842
and 1856-1860) were caused by aggressive expansion of the opium trade to China by the
British and subsequent Chinese attempts to prohibit its sale.5 In the 1870s, outraged by
their government’s use of force to expand trade in a substance they deplored, British
groups began to advocate against the opium trade. British Quakers and other “moral
2
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entrepreneurs,” Ethan Nadelmann’s term for individuals and groups who are the front
runners in defining a substance or practice as evil, formed the Anglo-Oriental Society for
the Suppression of the Opium Trade in 1874.6 By 1906, following the Liberal Party’s
ascendancy, the British government began to phase out opium exports from British India
to China. Nadelmann points to both the advocacy of the Anglo-Oriental Society for the
Suppression of the Opium Trade and like-minded groups, and to the diminishing
significance of opium revenues to account for this policy reversal.7 This redefinition of
state preferences by gradual pressure from domestic groups, changing political parties,
and shifting economic interests fits neatly with Andrew Moravcsik’s account of the
disaggregated state, discussed above.8
This pattern of pressure by domestic groups resulting in a change in state
preferences and subsequent change of foreign policy, was repeated in the United States.
A coalition of domestic groups including American missionaries to the Far East, various
religious groups, economic, and political interest groups was to:
prove largely successful in stimulating both state and federal drug
prohibition legislation with in the United States as well as the creation of a
global drug prohibition regime institutionalized in international
conventions and the drug control agencies of international organizations.9
Nadelmann’s account of the creation of the global drug prohibition regime closely
mirrors the logic of Campbell’s account of foreign policy as identity formation.
Prohibition movements were caused not by the legitimate fear of drug abuse, but rather
by popular association of certain drugs with certain marginalized populations within the
6
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United States. The earliest anti-opium laws, passed in 1875 in San Francisco, were
aimed at opium smoking, a practice associated with immigrant Chinese. Opium in the
form of laudanum or other liquids was associated with white women in the South and
West and was not prohibited.10
The first international anti-narcotics conference was held in Shanghai in 1909,
and the United States lobbied to restrict and criminalize the trade of opium in China and
elsewhere.11 This was followed by the 1912 Hague Opium Commission, which resulted
in binding commitments for states to restrict opium cultivation.12 The major international
treaties on the illicit narcotics trade are the 1961 Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the 1975
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 Convention against the Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.13
Cocaine is primarily produced in the South American Andean region (Colombia,
Peru, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia). Opium, the essential ingredient in heroin, is also
produced in Colombia, but most of the world's supply comes from Central and Southeast
Asia (the “Golden Crescent” of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan and “Golden Triangle” of
Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand respectively). The trade in cocaine travels from
source, the Andean region of South America, to sink. The United States of America is
the world's largest consumer of cocaine, though in recent years cocaine use has dropped
in the U.S. in favor of synthetic drugs, and the market in the European Union has begun
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to grow.14 Transit from source countries to the U.S. involves transnational cartels and
local gangs working in loose association to control local territory in transit states
(primarily the Northern Triangle of Central America – Honduras, Guatemala, and El
Salvador – and Mexico).15 The trade involves numerous moving parts that link together
the farmers who grow the coca plants and harvest the leaves, the production cartels that
secure and often tax those farmers, the transit cartels, the local gangs in Honduras or
other transit states, and the final smugglers who take the drugs into the U.S. All of these
groups are struggling against one another for more territory and profit, and against the
enforcement mechanisms that seek to prevent this trade, and in some cases, to profit by it.
The efforts of the U.S. to halt the production and transit of cocaine have
demonstrated that this problem cannot be resolved one state at a time. Every time one
state applies enough pressure on drug producers or smugglers to cause a reduction in
profits, the trade shifts to accommodate the change. This is called the balloon effect,
because like squeezing the middle of a balloon, rather than popping the pressure just
expands to new areas. The Mexican crackdown on Ciudad Juarez is in part what led to
the crisis in Honduras in 2011-2012.16 The influx of cocaine traffickers into Mexico in
the first place was due to the success of the Miami-based Caribbean interdiction unit in
the late 1980s and early 1990s.17
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The overwhelming bloodshed associated with the illicit drug trade and the United
States-sponsored war on drugs has been going on since the early 1970s, and there seems
to be no end in sight.18 Cartels grown powerful from profits associated with the drug
trade have overwhelmed the capacity of some affected states to respond. Mano Dura, or
hard-line, policies by governments have pushed violence into adjacent countries.
Refugees displaced by the violence are uprooted from their homes to seek safety
elsewhere. The cartels themselves have become strong transnational actors, forming
alliances with local youth gangs to project power over distance and utilizing the
international financial system to launder their profits.19 Some states cannot confront
these cartels because they simply do not have strong enough law enforcement, rule of law,
economic stability, or even popular legitimacy. Others cannot confront TCOs on their
own because doing so would require them to act within the borders of another state,
subverting sovereignty and possibly leading to greater regional instability.20

The Evolution of Global Terrorist Groups

Non-state groups with political motivations who violently and indiscriminately
target civilians to advance their goals are not altogether new in history. The Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO) was one of the first internationally-oriented groups that
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used terrorist tactics to advance political goals. The PLO model was to use the spectacle
of terrorism to attract attention from the international community. By 1968, television
and air travel had become ubiquitous. The PLO took advantage of those technological
innovations through airplane hijackings captured live on 24-hour news channels. Brian
Jenkins, a RAND Corporation terrorism expert, wrote of PLO-style terrorists that they,
“want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead.”21 Still, the PLO and groups
similar to it (e.g. the Basque separatist group ETA, the Irish Republican Army, and West
German terrorist groups) have goals that are geographically-bounded. Though their
tactics are international, like hijacking international flights, their goals are local. In
addition, for traditional terrorist groups, terrorism is a tactic used to accomplish a goal.
George Habash, one of the founders of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’s
(PFLP – at the time a primary component of the PLO), said of the hijackings, “When we
hijack a plane it has more effect than if we killed a hundred Israelis in battle. For decades
world public opinion has been neither for nor against the Palestinians. It simply ignored
us. At least the world is talking about us now.”22 Habash said that in an interview in
1970. The PLO achieved UN observer status in 1973.
Traditional terrorism harnessed changes in information and communication
technology to advance political goals through the targeting of civilians with violence.
The violence, however, was not indiscriminate. Targets were chosen because they would
attract the most attention, and with an aim to minimize unnecessary bloodshed. These
terrorists, “had a sense of morality, a self-image, operational codes, and practical
21
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concerns – they wanted to maintain group cohesion, avoid alienating perceived
constituents, and avoid provoking public outrage, which could lead to crackdowns.”23
Traditional terrorists felt that crackdowns would put their potential constituents in
danger because they were geographically bounded within certain areas. New terrorist
groups, typified by al Qaeda, count on crackdowns to create constituents. Because al
Qaeda has no geographically bounded population it is fighting for, it does not try to
prevent crackdowns. Inevitably when states crack down on asymmetrical groups,
innocent people are harmed in the crossfire. This creates a constituent base that groups
like al Qaeda can take and radicalize.
This phenomenon is highlighted in the fictional film Dirty War in which a violent
Islamic extremist group modeled on al Qaeda sets off a “dirty bomb” in London. The
film illustrates the extreme difficulty of preventing terrorist attacks from occurring,
especially this new sort. At one point a character is explaining that with the IRA the
British government was aware of 90 percent of what they were up to and attacks still got
through. With al Qaeda, the character says, we are lucky if we know 20 percent. Though
the film realistically portrays the near-impossibility of preventing terrorist attacks, the
most difficult challenge of fighting terrorism is revealed near the end of the movie. The
man primarily responsible for the attack has been apprehended and in his interrogation he
is asked why he would carry out such an attack when it is sure to produce a violent
reaction against the population he claims to represent. “We expect your reaction,” he
says. “It is what unites us and divides you.”24 This claim gets to the heart of the strategy
of terrorism. The primary goal of modern terrorism, as manifested by al Qaeda and its
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affiliates, is to provoke a true clash of civilizations. They want to start a war that will pit
all “good” Muslims against all non-believers.25
The change in goals, from circumscribed political goals like UN observer status to
maximalist goals like the reestablishment of the Islamic caliphate,26 is one of the effects
caused by combining terrorist tactics with fanatical religion. Religion can act as an
accelerant for terrorism, allowing terrorist groups to have millenarian or apocalyptic
goals. Specifically, al Qaeda and its affiliates preach a fundamentalist version of Islam
born from the combination of Salafi Islam and the historical experience of the victorious
jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s. This version of Islam preaches violent defensive jihad,
which accepts no compromise and sets millenarian goals. These goals allow for the
prospect of mass casualty attacks and a larger base from which to potentially recruit new
members, as the base is defined not by state but by faith. Millenarian goals make these
organizations and their followers think of time in completely different ways from
Western policymakers. When your goal is the reestablishment of the Islamic Caliphate or
the establishment of God’s kingdom on earth, you are less concerned about preventing
collateral damage, or public opinion.27 States, especially democratic states, need to
produce quick victories and demonstrable gains.28
While the introduction of religion to terrorism changed the size and scale of
terrorism, the changes in the structure of terrorist organizations had a much greater
impact on states’ ability to confront them. The traditional structure of illicit groups is
25
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pyramid-shaped. At the very bottom, the largest population that could be considered part
of the group, are passive supporters: people who agree with the aims of the organization,
but are not radical enough to get involved. On the next step up the pyramid are active
supporters: people who give financial backing, who shelter the people on the next step up.
Second to the top are the foot soldiers, and at the pinnacle are the command elite.29
This hierarchical structure worked very well for traditional terrorist groups –
groups that needed to control their foot soldiers and plan attacks. However, hierarchical
structures present simple targets for states. States could target the top of the pyramid and
thereby destroy or disable large sections of the organization. New terrorist groups moved
from a hierarchical structure to a hub and spoke structure, with the elite in the hub and the
foot soldiers aggregated into cells connected to the hub via spokes. Rohan Gunaratna
refers to this as al Qaeda 2.0.30 This structure, too, was amenable to being paralyzed by
state action if the hub of the organization was captured, killed, or forced into hiding. Al
Qaeda 3.0 is structured as a netwar organization.31 Netwar is a strategy also known as
“leaderless resistance.”32 New terrorist groups, like al Qaeda, are now enmeshed in a
web of interconnections. Leaders are not planners, but those who inspire. Plots are not
as sophisticated, but they are much less likely to be intercepted. Netwar organizations are
decentralized, dispersed nodes connected by a shared ideology, not necessarily
communicative spokes linked to the hub. It is a form of organizational structure used in
asymmetric warfare because it gives a huge offensive advantage due to the hidden nature
29
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of the netwar organization. While the first examples of netwar were seen in Latin
American guerrilla insurgencies, it is now being utilized by al Qaeda in its most recent
form. The information communication technology revolution has made netwar a much
more powerful strategy.33
Terrorism is a dramatic act – it aims to influence a third party, an audience to the
act. Modern terrorism is global not only in its reach and operation, but also in its target
audience. Al Qaeda wants Western audiences to watch, but is also attempting to
influence other Muslims to join the cause. The immediate goal of any terrorist group is
survival, and so al Qaeda constantly attempts to draw Muslims into their base of passive
supporters, convert those to active supporters, and radicalize those supporters to the point
where they will go on to commit acts of terror.34 They accomplish this through public
diplomacy (via media old and new, word of mouth, and social and religious institutions),
and effectively combating a larger foe (successful terrorist attacks that make their
enemies look weak).35 However, no amount of active recruitment on the part of terrorist
groups could convince the vast majority of even Salafi Muslims to join the violent cause.
For that, they rely on the inevitable collateral damage that accompanies state reprisals to
terrorist attacks.

Summary

Transnational threats have evolved at a pace and in a way that puts them at an
advantage against strong and weak states. Most states seem like giants compared against
33
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transnational threats, large and strong due to their command of resources and monopoly
on the legitimate use of force within their borders. Transnational threats, on the other
hand, act more like viruses, small and nimble and rapidly contagious, flitting from giant
to giant and thriving off of the giants’ inability to work together to come up with a cure.
What follows is a case by case examination of how the US and the EU have attempted to
confront transnational threats in cooperation with Colombia, in terms of drugs, and East
Africa, in terms of terrorism.
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Chapter 4: Case Study 1 – United States and European Union Strategies
to Confront Illicit Drug Trafficking in Colombia

In the preceding chapter I explained some of the key structural changes
transnational criminal groups have undergone with the amplification of the effects of
globalization. Here I will begin to compare and contrast the United States and the
European Union’s responses to the growing influence of drug traffickers in recent history.
With this case study I am attempting to uncover the “why” behind the failure or success
of a strategic response to transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) trafficking in illicit
drugs, looking at strategies of cooperation or imposition. Increased understanding of
what facilitates success in dealing with TCOs will help states determine what strategies to
use in the future. I hypothesize that in confronting transnational threats, strong states
should cooperate with small states, and if necessary, allow for weak states to take the
strategic lead.
This chapter will give an account of US and EU strategies of cooperation with
Colombia over the issue of illicit drug trafficking. First it will address the US and
Colombia, then the EU and Colombia. Each sub-case will begin with a brief historical
context section, will outline the strategy adopted, will analyze the interactions between
the strong and weak states in the strategy formation stage, and will code the sub-case
according to the five strategies of cooperation outlined in chapter two: strong state
imposition; strong state dominates, but weak state approves; strong state crafts strategy
with weak state input; strong and weak states participate equally; and weak state leads.
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The United States and Colombia

Colombia suffered a period of extreme political violence from 1948-1958 termed
“La Violencia,” costing the country between 200,000 and 300,000 lives over the ten year
period; more than a half a million (between 600,000 and 800,000) people were injured in
a conflict primarily between “self-defense” and guerrilla military units formed by the
country’s Liberal, Conservative, and Communist parties.1 The conflict began in the midtwentieth century and had its origins in the socio-economic inequalities institutionalized
in laws that favored the landed class.2 A lack of land reform and a radicalized political
dispute between conservatives and liberals led to the consolidation of unregulated and
illegal armies, both on the left and the right.3 La Violencia came to an end in 1958 with a
pact between the elites in the Liberal and Conservative parties to form a “National Front”
whereby Liberal and Conservatives would govern jointly and alternate the presidency.4
Some scholars argue that the violence continued on, in a different form, through the
1960s.5 This continuation of the conflict took place between those in power – the elites
of the Liberal and Conservative parties – and remnants of the Communist party and new
Castro-influenced groups. These communist-oriented groups succeeded in influencing
some of the bandit remnants of the old armed groups and some of the autonomous
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peasant collectives in the campo with their ideology.6 In 1966 various communist
guerrilla groups coalesced into the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),
with Manuel Marulanda Velez, a former Liberal party guerrilla during La Violencia in
the late 1940s, as its Chief of Staff.7
When US President Nixon declared a “War on Drugs” in 1969, Colombia was not
heavily involved in the trafficking of illicit drugs. Following the coup against Chilean
President Salvador Allende, which resulted in the rise to power of Augusto Pinochet in
1973, Pinochet launched a crackdown on Chilean cocaine traffickers. The production
and transit route of Andean cocaine then shifted into Colombia. Early moves by Nixon’s
newly formed Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) included Operation Intercept, an
operation that blockaded the Mexican border to halt the import of Mexican marijuana.
Also, the DEA put serious pressure on the “French Connection” heroin trade. These
moves made marijuana production too expensive for Colombian production, and
restricted the supply of heroin getting into the US, opening the US drug market to the
safer to smuggle and more profitable cocaine.8 The advent and rise of Colombian cartels
followed these developments.
The FARC grew in the 1980s, securing territory rich in natural resources like gold,
cattle, agriculture, and oil. They began to develop relationships with the illegal drug
industry following a change in FARC policy, which had previously forbidden the
cultivation of coca and marijuana. In 1981 the FARC began to promote and protect the
coca crop in order to undermine right-wing paramilitary groups’ alliance with drug
6
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traffickers.9 In 1998 guerrilla groups in Colombia, including the FARC, the National
Liberation Army (ELN), and several smaller groups, derived $551 million from working
with drug traffickers, much more than from extortion ($311 million) and kidnapping
($236 million), their other major income sources.10 Left-leaning guerrilla groups are not
the only ones to draw significant amounts of their funding from the trafficking of drugs.
The United Self-Defense Forces, or right-wing paramilitary groups (sometimes referred
to as “Death Squads”), similarly profit from the cultivation of drugs in their territory.11
The civil conflict in Colombia intersects with the illicit drug trade in significant ways.
An editorial in the New York Times put it this way in 2000, “In recent years both the
guerrillas and murderous right-wing paramilitary squads associated with the [Colombian
National] army have earned millions of dollars from the drug trade.”12
Andres Pastrana took office as president of Colombia in 1998 as the candidate
promising peace.13 His two primary objectives were negotiating a conclusion to the
decades-long civil conflict in Colombia and improving foreign relations with the US.14
While Pastrana enjoyed relatively good relations with President Clinton at the beginning
of his term – he was invited to the White House shortly after his inauguration in 199815 –
he did not have such immediate success in achieving his other objective.

9

Rabasa & Chalk, p. 26.
Ibid, pp. 32-33.
11
Ibid, p. 33.
12
“Dangerous Plan for Colombia,” Editorial, New York Times, (2/13/2000), web, retrieved through
ProQuest Historical Newspapers on 3/4/14.
13
Diana Jean Schemo, “Colombia Installs New President Who Plans to Talk to Rebels,” New York Times,
(8/8/1998), web, retrieved through ProQuest Historical Newspapers on 3/4/14.
14
Jonathan D. Rosen, “Plan Colombia and Beyond: Pastrana to Santos (2000 to 2012),” Open Access
Dissertations, Paper 880, (2012), p. 39.
15
“William J. Clinton: The President’s News Conference with President Andres Pastrana of Colombia,”
web, accessed 12/2/2013, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=55165>, (1998).
10

54

For Pastrana, the road to peace led through some form of socio-economic reform,
and to address the structural inequalities of the country – especially in the rural parts of
the country – he called for a “Marshall Plan” for Colombia.16 Early reports on this plan
defined it as follows, “an ambitious array of ideas [Pastrana] has formulated to curtail
drug trafficking and restore a nation reeling from decades of war.”17 Early parts of the
plan created a government bond program aimed at bringing modern infrastructure to
“rural areas where poverty and government indifference have allowed coca growing and
rebel movements to thrive.”18 The Colombian State Secretary of Culture said of
Pastrana’s plan, “The Marshall Plan here would be called agrarian reform.”19
Pastrana’s peace talks stalled when he offered a large zone of peace to the primary
leftist insurgent group, the FARC. The FARC took this demilitarized area and set up
camp, fielding troops and acting with impunity.20 In 1999 the pre-negotiations Pastrana
initiated following his election resulted in a stalemate – a problem of “structural and
strategic symmetry”21 between the government and the FARC. In order to break the
stalemate and drive the FARC to make concessions, Pastrana turned to the United States
for assistance, 22 and the US urged Pastrana to develop a plan that could be acted upon by
Washington.23
Plan Colombia grew out of this push by Pastrana for a Marshall Plan for
Colombia. While Pastrana envisioned broad international support, totaling around $7.5
16
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billion over three years ($4 billion of which Colombia would raise internally and 3.5
billion would come from international sources),24 in the end Plan Colombia became US
public law 106-246, a bilateral assistance plan between the US and Colombia subtitled
“assistance for counternarcotics activities.”25
The substance of Plan Colombia was $7 billion from FY2000 to FY 2010 from
the US State Department and Department of Defense accounts26 for “counternarcotics
and related efforts.”27 In the first year (FY2000-FY2001), around $860 million was
provided, primarily for equipment and training for counternarcotics units within the
Colombian Army.28 In order to assist with aerial defoliation on coca fields, the US
provided funds for the purchase and transfer of UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter and UH-1H
Huey II helicopters, as well as other equipment.29 Much of the US funding went to the
“Push into Southern Colombia” program, training and equipping two new
counternarcotics battalions in the Colombian Army who were to assist the Colombian
National Police with fumigation of illicit crops and the dismantling of drug laboratories.30
Following the formation of the Plan, Colombia began to distance itself from its
implementation, “the government of President Andres Pastrana has been reluctant to
promote the plan at home or to dedicate funds to it, American officials concede.”31 With

24

Sanin, p. 424.
P.L. 106-246, 106th Congress “An act making appropriations for military construction, family housing,
and base realignment and closure for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30,
2001, and for other purposes,” (2000) 114 Stat. 571.
26
Clare Ribando Seelke, Liana Sun Wyler, and June S. Bittel, “Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit
Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs,” Congressional Research Service, R41215 (2011), p. 13
27
Nina M. Searfino, “Colombia: Conditions and U.S. Policy Options,” Congressional Research Service,
Report for Congress, RL30330 (2001), p. 1.
28
Ibid, p. 1.
29
P.L. 106-246, 114 Stat. 572.
30
Nina M. Serfino, “Colombia: Summary and Tables on U.S. Assistance, FY1989-FY2003,”
Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, RS21213 (2002), p. 2.
31
Christopher Marquis, “Ambitious Antidrug Plan For Colombia Is Faltering,” New York Times, web,
accessed via ProQuest Historical Newspapers on 3/4/14, (10/15/2000).
25

56

the incoming Bush administration, and following the 9/11 attacks, the scope of Plan
Colombia was expanded to encompass more of the surrounding region with the Andean
Regional Initiative (ARI). While more funding was made available to states near
Colombia (Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Panama, and Venezuela), the central focus of
the plan was the training and equipping of counternarcotics forces in Colombia.32 The
ARI, funded by US public law 107-206 in August 2002 extended Plan Colombia’s central
provisions, extended and broadened the Andean Trade Preference Act, introduced
counterterrorism funding, and included more funding for economic and social
programs.33 The act was further broadened to include increased funding for a Colombian
army brigade to protect an oil pipeline, and became US public law 108-7 in 2003.34
Colombian aid was again expanded in the FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental
Aid, an appropriations bill primarily for the war in Iraq and the global war on terror.35
In one account of the origins and evolution of Plan Colombia the authors argue,
“It is important to note that in the first version of Plan Colombia there was hardly any
mention of military strategies.”36 Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American
Dialogue and professor of Latin American Studies at Gerogetown University, argued in a
retrospective of Plan Colombia in Americas Quarterly that:
The original version of Plan Colombia emphasized development and
social priorities – both of which received short shrift in the program that
was eventually adopted in Washington. But the Colombian government,
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under Pastrana administration, also requested some $600 million in
military assistance from the United States.37
Pastrana’s original plan focused on the economy more than the military, but it did include
a significant amount for the military. The goal for Pastrana was to make peace with these
forces by way of addressing the socio-economic inequalities at the heart of the conflict,
whereas about 70 percent of the $1.3 billion the US provided for Plan Colombia was
directed to Colombia's military.38 The fact that the armed groups on either side of this
conflict received funds from growing and selling narcotics was not a central part of
Pastrana’s strategy to confront them.39
Following his election, Pastrana fulfilled a campaign promise by ordering
Colombian security forces to temporarily evacuate five municipalities,40 attempting to
create a climate of trust in order to facilitate peace negotiations.41 Instead the FARC used
the cease fire zone, or Zona de Distensión, as a base of operations from which they could
fortify their position.42 Negotiations between the government of Colombia, led by
President Pastrana, and the FARC did not advance by the summer of 1999.43 The Zona
de Distensión was extended while the stalemate continued, allowing the FARC to
continue fortifying their position.44
Robert E. White, a former US Ambassador to Paraguay and El Salvador, states
that in a 1998 version of Plan Colombia circulated by the Pastrana administration, there
37
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was no mention of military assistance or the Drug War, but rather a request for US aid to
assist Colombia with social and economic reforms.45 Thomas Pickering, at the time
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, recounts that in late summer of 1999 he
received a call from Sandy Berger, President Clinton’s National Security Advisor, saying
that, “Things are getting worse in Colombia.”46 Before visiting Colombia in the fall of
1999 (when Pastrana would reveal Plan Colombia), Pickering and several US
policymakers developed an outline of what would become Plan Colombia:
Peter Romero and Rand Beers, respectively the Assistant Secretaries of
State for Inter-American (later Western Hemisphere) Affairs and
Narcotics and Crime, suggested we visit Pastrana and his new team in
Bogotá, review their plans and see where to go from there. I [Pickering]
suggested that we needed a plan of our own in mind before our flight went
wheels-up, and together we conceived a joint plan based partly on what
we knew the Colombian government was already doing, and partly on
how we could help them improve and strengthen that effort.47
The trip to Bogotá involved members from the US Department of State; representatives
of the National Security Council; the White House Office of National Drug Control
Policy led by General Barry McCaffrey; the Defense Department’s Latin American and
Special Operations Divisions; the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Unified Commander in the
Hemisphere; the Agency for International Development (USAID); the Department of
Justice and several other relevant domestic departments and agencies, including members
of the intelligence community and the CIA to provide support and analysis.
During that first visit Pickering and the team met with President Pastrana and
members of his cabinet, and there they pitched the ideas they had come up with, arguing
that, “First, we agreed that this would be a Colombian plan, prepared in Colombia and
45
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presented by Colombia, with close U.S. assistance with planning and implementation.
Second, the central focus of the plan would be to reduce the cultivation and export of
drugs...”48 The US representatives put the responsibility for the creation of a strategy to
confront the transnational threat of illicit narcotics trafficking in the hands of the
Colombian government, and then directed them on the priorities and content of that
strategy.
The Plan laid out by Pastrana following this visit was formulated at the behest of
and with the assistance of US policymakers:49 “The plan that was unveiled in September
of 1999 cited the production of illegal drugs as central to Colombia’s political violence,
dedicating entire sections of the document to this topic.”50 Michael Shifter argues that,
“The drug question was the hook that enabled Congress to enact the $1.3-billion
package.... By focusing on counter-narcotics, the Clinton administration sold a plan that
could garner bipartisan support.”51
Shortly after the passage of P.L. 106-246 a New York Times article alleged that,
“Although the Clinton administration has portrayed Plan Colombia as Mr. Pastrana’s
work, much of it was drafted by American officials, according to people familiar with its
preparation.”52 The article went on to connect the emergence of the Plan to pressure on
the democratic Clinton administration, and specifically General Barry McCaffrey, by
Congressional Republicans for being “soft on crime.” Moreover, the funding for the Plan

48

Ibid, (2009).
Ibid, (2009).
50
William Avilés, “US Intervention in Colombia: The Role of Transnational Relations,” Bulletin of Latin
American Research, 27:3 (2008), p. 418.
51
Shifter, (2012).
52
Marquis, (2000).
49

60

from Colombia fell short of its goals, possibly signaling reluctance on the part of the
Pastrana administration:
Analysts say Mr. Pastrana is torn between hopes that the American
attention and largess could provide Colombia with a rare opportunity for
foreign investment, on the one hand, and concerns, on the other, that
deepening ties to the Pentagon could unleash greater violence in Colombia
and possibly draw in its neighbors.53
The debate in the US took place both at the executive and legislative ends of
policymaking. According to a 2009 USAID report on Plan Colombia:
The fundamental philosophical camps within the US centered on whether
US aid should emphasize counter-narcotics, social programs, counterinsurgency and in what relative proportions the aid should be provided.
[…] As the PC [Plan Colombia] proposal worked its way through the
political process on the Hill, the counter-insurgency objective was dropped
from the plan. What was left was a robust CN [counter-narcotics]
(interdiction & eradication) effort on the “hard” side (about ¾ of funds)
and significantly increased support for “soft” programs (about ¼ of
funds).54
The political compromise eventually arrived at did not take Pastrana’s plan as a point of
departure. The USAID report goes on to say that:
Rather than a traditional building of the budget from the ground up with
input from the people at the “worker bee” level, the appropriations amount
to fund U.S. assistance to PC ($1.3B) was arrived at by leaders in
Congress who picked an initial amount because they believed this was as
much as the “political market” on the Hill would support. PC contained
dozens of line items earmarking sums of money for specific pet projects,
often without clear guidance as to what agency would be responsible for
executing the program.55
On the Colombian end, in the words of a former Colombian peace commissioner:
The plan was never consulted, discussed, or debated within Colombia
before it was presented abroad. Neither the directly-affected local
communities nor their elected officials were brought into the decision53
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making process. While the U.S. Congress has held countless hearings and
open sessions on Plan Colombia, the Colombian Congress has yet to hold
its first.56
From accounts inside the US and Colombian administrations, the formation of Plan
Colombia took place primarily inside the US. The European Parliament’s resolution on
Plan Colombia states that:
…Plan Colombia is not the product of a process of dialogue amongst the
various social partners or of progress in the negotiations with the guerrillas,
has not been approved by the Colombian Congress and has provoked
widespread opposition from many sectors of Civil Society in the United
States, Europe, Latin America and particularly in Colombia itself…57
These accounts indicate that Colombian legislature and civil society had little input in the
formation of Plan Colombia, and were, by and large, unsupportive of the Plan following
its publication.
Based on the methodology outlined above, Plan Colombia and its subsequent
iterations were an example of (1) strong state imposition of a strategy to confront
transnational crime. While there was some weak state input, the strategy was formulated
nearly entirely inside the US, by US policymakers in the executive and legislative
branches. What high-level meetings took place appear, by the accounts of those in
attendance, to have been used by US policymakers to outline the strategy they expected
the Colombian government to condone. Weak state priorities, such as economic and
social development, were not included in Plan Colombia, except as “alternative
development.” Part of what accounts for this was the expectation that European countries
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would provide funding for those “softer” goals,58 but as we will see below the EU did not
provide that funding and subsequent US funding did not react to that development and
adjust funding accordingly. Finally, as noted above, Colombia under the Pastrana
administration did not fund the Plan fully, indicating a lack of domestication of the
strategy.

The European Union and Colombia

The preceding section illustrated and categorized the United States’ strategy of
cooperation with Colombia against transnational drug trafficking. Here I will do the
same for the European Union’s strategy of cooperation with the same weak state,
confronting the same problem. I expect to find a large difference between the US and the
EU’s approaches to cooperating with Colombia on the issue of transnational crime.
European countries consumed about 30 percent of Colombian produced cocaine at
the time Plan Colombia was being debated in 1999 – the world’s second largest market
after the US.59 The cocaine market in Europe grew rapidly in the 1990s, though it
remained overshadowed by Europe’s much larger heroin market.60 In the year 2000, the
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) in the US estimated that up to 220 tons
of cocaine made its way to Europe. The US received an estimated 330 tons, by far the
largest recipient in the world, but not an increase from years past. Though the European
58
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estimate was numerically smaller, it represented a very large increase in a short period of
time, jumping about ten percent every year in the 1990s.61 “Europol, the European
Union’s fledgling police agency, said in a recent report that 35 percent of Colombia’s
cocaine was winding up in the union,” stated a 2001 New York Times article.62 Sayaka
Fukumi, the author of a recent study of US and EU policy responses to Latin American
cocaine said of the European cocaine market in the late 1990s, “Due to the rapid growth
of the European cocaine market, the EU began to become involved in cocaine control.”63
In October of 1999, a month after unveiling Plan Colombia, President Pastrana
traveled to Europe to request EU participation in the Plan. In his speech before the
European Parliament, Pastrana addressed the link between drug trafficking and the
guerrilla groups operating in Colombia, and asked for European assistance in Colombia’s
path to peace:
To this end I have drawn up the Colombia Plan for peace, prosperity and
the strengthening of the State. It is not a military plan. It is a
comprehensive and unified plan aimed at strengthening such basic issues
for our country as the search for peace, the reactivation of our economy
and the generation of employment, the protection of human rights, the
strengthening of justice and the increase in social participation. The final
result will be the strengthening of our State, as the essential requirement
for the achievement of peace and progress.
We need your participation on all these fronts but principally we
need you, your nations and the whole of Europe to invest in peace for the
sake of peace, and to open up your markets so that we can create
employment for the sake of peace.
For this reason, Colombia is presenting the international
community with an alternative policy for the eradication of illegal crops
based on an alternative development which offers the rural population,
which is currently involved in illegal cultivation, a permanent escape from
their economic and social problems, replacing illegal crops with
61

Juan Forero, “Europe Expands as Market for Colombian Cocaine,” New York Times, web, accessed
through ProQuest Historical Newpapers on 3/29/14, (5/29/2001).
62
Ibid.
63
Sayaka Fukumi, Cocaine Trafficking in Latin America: EU and US Policy Responses, Burlington, VT:
Ashgate Publishing Company (2008), p. 111.

64

commercial, mining, agricultural, agro-industrial and service companies,
and with the necessary infrastructure so that they may compete adequately
in the world’s globalised economy.64
Though very different from the Plan discussed in the last section, the aims discussed in
Pastrana’s speech do not conflict with the general outline given by Pickering, McCaffrey,
and the other US policymakers who visited Bogotá in 1999; rather they emphasize the
elements of his original strategy – peace with the guerilla groups, and economic and
social development – that were minimized or entirely neglected in the US strategy.
Pastrana’s emphasis on peace and development in his attempt to sell Plan
Colombia to the EU bears a striking resemblance to his early speeches on a “Marshall
Plan” for Colombia – a plan to modernize Colombia and alleviate poverty in order to
address the social and political issues underlying the violent conflict.65 This similarity
makes claims that Pastrana was simply playing to his audience – speaking in terms of
counternarcotics to the US and in terms of peace and development to the EU – dubious.
Rather, it seems that in Europe Pastrana found an audience more receptive to his original
plan. Europe was interested in assisting Colombia with its peace process.
In July of 2000 the EU sent a delegation to the Support Group for the Peace
Process in Colombia, a group of states offering support and good offices for negotiations
regarding the cessation of hostilities in Colombia’s civil conflict with the FARC, ELN,
and AUC, urging the government of Colombia to do more to break up paramilitary
groups. In October of 2000 the General Affairs Council released a statement reaffirming
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the EU’s support for the peace process and offering the EU’s good offices for
negotiations. The EU Presidency and Commission attended the Support Group for the
Peace Process in Colombia meeting in October of 2000 in Bogotá.66 Furthermore, in the
European Parliament’s resolution on Plan Colombia it is stated that, “lasting peace cannot
be achieved in Colombia without deep-seated changes to the means by which wealth is
distributed, since many of the problems confronting the country stem from the fact that
peasant farmers do not own land,”67 echoing the sentiment of President Pastrana’s State
Secretary of Culture who argued that agrarian reform is necessary for peace and
development.68
Despite the evident accord between Pastrana and the EU’s approach, the EU
refused to have any part of Plan Colombia. In a resolution passed in the European
Parliament 474-1 condemning Plan Colombia for being overly militaristic, the Parliament
asked for a different strategy with more input from the government of Colombia,
Colombian civil society, neighboring states, and an EU-sponsored team of experts sent to
Colombia.69 Even before the Parliament’s resolution, a largely symbolic act, the
European Union undercut Plan Colombia by not funding it as expected: “Signaling
reservations about Colombia’s deep reliance on American military support, the European
Union announced a package of nonmilitary aid today that fell short of expectations.”70 A
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different news article discussed in detail how the EU balked at providing expected
funding for a plan they find overly militaristic.71
The European rejection of Plan Colombia was neatly summed up by a European
envoy quoted in a New York Times article at the time, “The E.U. and member states are
supporting the peace process in Colombia and not specifically the Plan Colombia, which
is an American project.”72 Joaquin Roy, a professor at the School of International Studies
in the University of Miami, characterizes the European perception of Plan Colombia as
follows:
In crude terms never present in documents or veiled declarations, there is
the prevailing European impression that the Colombians will contribute
the dead, the Americans will supply the military hardware, and the
Europeans will contribute the money to defray the cost of the social and
environmental damage caused by the other two parties. That is to say,
European assistance is perceived in different European circles as a sort of
remedy once the implementation of the U.S.-led military plan is
terminated.73
The EU, determining that Plan Colombia was a US invention and betting that it would
not work, contributed a small amount of nonmilitary aid under the auspices of the Plan,
and then attempted to create a different strategy.
This alternative approach focused on the peace process rather than narcotics,
though it recognized the tie between the two issues:
The EU knows, however, that the biggest contribution it could make to
peace and sustainable economic growth in Colombia would be to curb
drug demand, and stifle the numerous illegal activities related to drug
trafficking that fuel the Colombian conflict.74
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Observing European trepidation regarding the US-backed Plan Colombia, Colombian
officials invited Europe to propose “a special plan for Colombia,” and arranged for a
meeting between Colombian Foreign Minister Fernández de Soto and EU External
Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten.75 Patten spearheaded the project of EU involvement
in and support for what was called the Peace Process, avoiding the term Plan Colombia.
He proposed to “member states that a European aid programme for Colombia be set
up.”76 This aid would not be primarily through Plan Colombia, but rather through the
Cartagena Agreement,77 the agreement EU relations with Colombia, and the other
Andean Community states, is based on.78
The EU approach to Colombia was more complex than the US approach in part
because the EU is a collection of member states whereas the US is a single state. Some
member states cooperated with both the EU plan and Plan Colombia. The UK, for
example, provided military assistance to Colombia despite the EU insistence that further
militarizing the conflict would be detrimental to the peace process.79 However, according
to Fukumi, “Although the member states have different approaches, the common aim of
the European Union is to support the Colombian government to achieve its goals for
peace building.”80
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The major project supported with EU funding in Colombia was the Peace
Laboratory in Magdalena Medio, Colombia.81 Magdalena Medio is “one of the poorest
and most violent areas of the country,”82 though rich in natural resources like oil, and
therefore it has been host to FARC, AUC, and ELN forces since the 1960s.83 The Peace
Laboratory grew from the Program for Development and Peace in Magdalena Medio
(PDPMM), a joint NGO, church, and Colombian government project that began in the
mid-1990s. The aim was to create the Consortium for Development and Peace
Magdalena Medio (CDPMM) to act as program manager, to form and strengthen a
network among citizens in the region, and to provide technical support and funding to
community organization for specific projects.84
Following the EU consultation process, the high level dialogue between Patten
and Fernández de Soto as well as the fact-finding missions the EU and member states
sent to Colombia,85 Chris Patten announced in 2001 that the EU had confirmed a
contribution to the Colombian Peace Process of about $304 million, later raised to $366
million.86 Ten months later, the first of the specific projects funded by the EU were
announced in the Magdalena Medio region.87 The Peace Laboratory was simply the
application of EU funding to an existing Colombian civil society program, scaling up an
already successful program: “The strategic and methodological conception of the Peace
81
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Laboratory is based on the original concept of the Peace and Development Programme of
Magdalena Medio.”88 By 2001 the PDPMM had already carried out 67 investment
project initiatives, won Colombia’s National Peace Prize, and was an organization trusted
by the local communities.89 The Peace Laboratory more than doubled the budget of the
original PDPMM,90 but maintained local control over the program through the
CDPMM.91 The Peace Laboratory enabled the CDPMM to channel funding to specific
projects in education, health, infrastructure, agrarian reform, voluntary drug crop
eradication, and alternative development.92 Fukumi summarizes the EU approach to
Colombia as follows:
In order to support Colombia, the European Union launched a project to
create a peace zone to weaken the insurgency groups and encourage legal
crop cultivation. Its non-military approach has helped to promote
voluntary eradication. However, the issues of safety and security related
to the project’s operation have remained unsolved.93
The EU believes that the military is the wrong tool to use when combating the production
and trafficking of illicit narcotics, and this belief is made manifest in the EU
contributions to the Colombian Peace Process – funding for grassroots projects managed
by Colombian civil society with an emphasis on alternative development.94
The strategy of cooperation employed by the EU to develop their approach to the
Colombian drug issue has its roots in the region-to-region “Framework Agreement on
Cooperation” signed by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela, and the
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European Community (which would become the EU).95 The general strategy of
cooperation the EU employs for cooperation with other states is laid out by the European
Commission: the EU plays the role of an assistant on projects “owned” by member states.
“The EU claims that it does not ‘negotiate’ with the Latin American countries to sponsor
a project, but they ‘discuss’ the priorities and requests from the Latin American
governments.”96 Fukumi’s interpretation of the EU’s perception of its own strategy,
drawn from EU documents and interviews with European Commission officials, is that
they allow the weak state to take the lead in developing a strategy (program, policy, or
plan), “because the EU considers that the initiatives belong to the host state (or the
‘owner’ of the project) and this influences the progress and outcome of the project.”97
However, according to Colombian officials, the process is less weak state-led than
the EU would like the world to believe. According to a Colombian official at the
Colombian embassy in Brussels, the negotiation process with the EU begins with the EU
revealing the amount of money that will be spent on the recipient state. Then the EU
reviews a list of proposals from potential civil society partners, and the decision on which
proposals is made. According to the EU country strategy paper, the decision is supposed
to be made jointly between the EU and the recipient state, but in reality, according to this
Colombian official, the EU sometimes decides alone.98 That said, the process by which
the EU Peace Process plan was drafted had many of the elements of weak state strategic
leadership. The process of strategy formation began in Europe with President Pastrana’s
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plea for assistance and submission of the US-backed Plan Colombia.99 The subsequent
debate in Europe centered on the degree to which Plan Colombia represented the interests
of the US, and not of Colombia.100 The European rejection of Plan Colombia stated that
Plan Colombia was a Clinton administration military aid package and that, “Plan
Colombia contains aspects that run counter to the cooperation strategies and projects to
which the EU has already committed itself and jeopardise its cooperation programmes,”
and that increased militarization threatened to escalate the conflict.101
The rejection of Plan Colombia came alongside a recommendation to reformulate
the strategy – to create a “special plan for Colombia” in the words of the Colombian
authorities102 – in a way that situated the issue of counternarcotics within the broader
social, economic, and political issues in Colombia. To do so, the EU sent a group of
experts to Colombia to seek input and to work with Colombian officials to develop a
strategy.103 At the same time, high level meetings between the Colombian Foreign
Minister Fernández de Soto and EU External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten resulted
in the re-branding of the EU-Colombia plan as the “Peace Process.”
The three areas Patten and Fernández de Soto agreed would receive significant aid
were human rights, the reduction of socio-economic disparities, and institutional
reinforcement.104 These fit with Pastrana’s priorities:
It is a comprehensive and unified plan aimed at strengthening such basic
issues for our country as the search for peace, the reactivation of our
economy and the generation of employment, the protection of human
99
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rights, the strengthening of justice and the increase in social participation.
The final result will be the strengthening of our State, as the essential
requirement for the achievement of peace and progress.105
The provisions of the weak state, economic and social development, peace, institution
building, and human rights are all maintained in the final EU strategy.
Finally, the provisions of the strategy that needed to be implemented by Colombia,
participation and support for the Peace Laboratories and other Civil Society-EU
partnerships, was fully implemented under President Pastrana.106 However, there was a
significant degree of polarization within Colombian society. As the conflict dragged on,
the Colombian government became more militarized as evidenced by the election of
Alvaro Uribe Velez in 2002, a hard-line candidate committed to defeating the FARC, as
well as by Pastrana’s tonal shift following the 9/11 attacks in the US, labeling the FARC
“narcotraficantes” and terrorists, in line with US rhetoric.107 A strong peace movement
was still present, but it was located primarily within Colombian civil society. The Peace
Process ended in 2002, but the Peace Laboratories went on, with more opening up in
2003 and 2006.108 Still, in the Peace Laboratories, civil society and the central
government (as well as local institutions) all participated and utilized EU funding.109
The EU strategy of cooperation is more complicated and nuanced than the US
strategy, with different levels and interests at work. However, in the reformulated
strategy known as the Peace Process, Colombia, both civil society and government,
seems to have cooperated equally with the European Union (4). There was substantial
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Colombian input in the plan, demonstrated by the high-level meetings between Patten
and Fernández de Soto as well as between Pastrana and European experts and
ambassadors both in Brussels and Bogotá. Also, the priorities articulated by Pastrana and
his cabinet were maintained in the final strategy. The formation of the strategy took
place both in Europe and in Colombia, and the primary aspects of the strategy were
implemented by both parties.

Summary of Cases

The US and the EU approaches to cooperation with Colombia regarding
transnational crime were vastly different. The US imposed a set of policies and programs
on Colombia with Plan Colombia, taking a Colombian initiative and transforming it to
suit the US’s domestic political exigency. The EU strategy included much more
Colombian input, forming and implementing programs in Colombia with the Colombian
government and civil society. In chapter six, below, I will attempt to judge the relative
success or failure of these policies and programs in order to see which strategy of
cooperation tends to produce more effective solutions to the problem of transnational
threats.
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Chapter 5: Case Study 2 – United States and European Union Strategies to
Confront Global Terrorism in East Africa

This case study will compare and contrast the United States and the European
Union’s approaches to working with East African states to disrupt terrorist networks and
plots. In undertaking this case study I am attempting to categorize the US and EU’s
strategies of cooperation towards the countries and region of East Africa in order to
correlate those strategies with the degree of success or failure in confronting the threat of
global terrorism. I hypothesize that in confronting transnational terrorist groups, strong
states should cooperate with small states, and if necessary, allow for weak states to take
the strategic lead.
For the purposes of this thesis, within the region of East Africa I will focus on
Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda.1 The greater region, which will be included in the general
overview of the US approach, encompasses countries in the Horn of Africa, the Nile
Valley, and the Great Lakes regions of Africa: Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea,
Djibouti, Rwanda, Burundi, and Somalia.2 All of these states share proximity to, if not a
direct coastline with, the Indian Ocean or the Red Sea, making them near neighbors to the
Arabian Peninsula.3 The majority of US and EU policy to this region, as will be shown
below, targets some combination of these states. This chapter will begin with an account
1
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of the US approach to working with the region with respect to counterterrorism, devoting
more time and detail to significant (in terms of resource contributions) policy changes
either on the state or regional level. Then I will analyze the policy formation process,
with special attention to Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, and code the US strategy of
cooperation according to the table discussed in chapter two. I will then repeat those steps
with the EU approach and policy formation process. Finally, this chapter will conclude
with a brief summary of the case study.

The United States and East Africa

There is no single day that has more changed the face of international politics in
recent history than September 11, 2001.4 Both the attacks themselves and the US
response to them contributed to creating the new normal we now live in. The attacks
commonly referred to as the “9/11 attacks” triggered the Bush administration in the US to
completely revise its approach to national security:
The terror of 11 September 2001 compounded the perception of US
exceptionalism and the sense of a changed security environment.
According to [US diplomat James] Dobbins, “Before September 11, 2001,
the moderate, conservative and neoconservative elements of the Bush
administration’s policy had been in rough balance. The 9/11 attacks
changed all this. They stimulated an immediate and understandably
unilateralist impulse to retaliate.5
To say that the 9/11 attacks caught the US by surprise would be a gross understatement.
Even after the first plane hit the World Trade Center the White House went about its
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everyday business, assuming the crash was accidental.6 By the end of the day 19 al
Qaeda members, directed from afar and instructed in both the US and abroad, had killed
nearly 3,000 people on American soil in a coordinated attack.7 Beyond the immediate
death toll, thousands more were injured, families were destroyed, the economy was badly
shaken,8 and a psychological blow had been dealt to the American psyche.9
The US response to the 9/11 attacks was to declare the “War on Terror.” On
September 20, 2001 in an address to Congress, President Bush said, “Our war on terror
begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group
of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.”10 The traditional policy
instruments states have to use are diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence, military
means, and finance. However President Bush’s statement indicated that the US approach
would focus on the military.
East Africa was the location of the first salvo in al Qaeda’s fight against the
United States. Sudan was a safe haven for Islamic extremist groups in the 1990s when
the Khartoum government actively supported groups including al Qaeda. Osama bin
Laden based al Qaeda out of Sudan from 1992-1996, at which point he was expelled from
the state due to US pressure. In Somalia, al Qaeda claimed to have trained the factions
involved in the “Black Hawk Down” incident, otherwise known as the Battle of
6
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Mogadishu, that resulted in the deaths of 18 US soldiers.11 In 1998, US embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania were the targets of al Qaeda bombings, killing 227 and wounding
hundreds.12 In 2002 al Qaeda-linked terrorists attacked a hotel in Mombassa, Kenya.13
Following the US invasion of Afghanistan, East Africa was suspected of becoming the
next headquarters of al Qaeda, most likely in lawless Somalia.14 This suspicion proved to
have some validity when internal al Qaeda documents showed that their leadership had
considered Somalia as an alternative to Afghanistan.15 According to Lyman and
Morrison, the conditions in the region are ripe for transnational terrorism: “The Greater
Horn of Africa – an area that includes Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti,
Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya – is home to interlocking conflicts, weak and failing states,
pervasive corruption, and extreme poverty.”16
However, the region has not become al Qaeda’s home. “Al Qaeda has used the
region less to foment terrorism than to protect and expand its finances.”17 Al Qaeda took
advantage of the chaotic situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to
gain a foothold in their mineral trade, having already established a stake in the trafficking
of gems through East African networks.18 In order to disrupt this practice, the US under
the Clinton administration was a strong supporter of the Kimberly Process, an initiative
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put forward by diamond-producing countries along with diamond manufacturing
companies to keep gems from conflict zones like the DRC from the market. The Bush
administration, however, had been “largely indifferent to it, having been slow to sign up
to its monitoring provisions.”19
Other globally-oriented terrorist groups in the area are al-Ittihad al-Islamiya
(AIAI), a Somalia-based globally-oriented terrorist group, which was active in Somalia in
the 1990s but has since been significantly damaged by Ethiopian military efforts,20 and al
Shabaab, a Somalia-based al Qaeda affiliated terrorist group that has struck targets across
the region and shares capabilities with other affiliates like al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP).21 AIAI, though based in Somalia, gained in influence in Kenya as it
was forced out of Somalia in the 1990s.22 Young leaders of AIAI split off to form al
Shabaab in the 1990s.23 In 2010, the US State Department characterized the threat posed
by the globally-oriented terrorist groups in East Africa: “Al-Shabaab’s leadership was
supportive of al-Qa’ida (AQ), and both groups continued to present a serious terrorist
threat to American and allied interests throughout the Horn of Africa.”24
US counterterrorism cooperation in the area was focused on bilateral efforts from
the embassy bombings in 1998 until 9/11. Following the 1998 embassy bombing in
Nairobi, the security sector of Kenya (the police and the military) began to work in closer
cooperation with US forces. This cooperation was sometimes direct, for example, when
investigating links between Islamic NGOs and militant Islamic terrorist groups, US FBI
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agents and Kenyan police conducted a joint raid on the Islamic NGO Mercy Relief
International.25 Between the US and Sudan, “An intensive counterterrorism dialogue
between the two governments commenced in the spring of 2000 and accelerated
dramatically after September 11, when the United States threatened additional measures
[following the US bombing of a factory in 1998] – while also promising to improve
relations if Sudan cooperated fully and quickly.”26 The stuff of these bilateral efforts was
primarily functionalist and ad hoc, alliances of convenience against a common enemy
when the need arose. The 9/11 attacks changed that approach.
In late 2002 the US State Department and the Pentagon began to implement a
series of Africa-focused counterterrorism initiatives. In 2002 the United States created
the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA). This involved 1,800 US
soldiers backed by US Central Command and based in Djibouti.27 In June 2003 US
President Bush launched the East African Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI),
promising $100 million to the region over 15 months.28 Around half of the funds were
aimed at improving coastal and border security programs, $10 million was directed
towards the Kenyan Anti-terror Police Unit, and $14 million was aimed at the softer side
of US counterterrorism – Muslim education.29 In 2009 the State Department launched a
follow-up program to EACTI called the East African Regional Strategic Initiative
(EARSI), which “aims to foster regional counterterrorism efforts, build partner capacity,
and diminish support for violent extremism.”30 In 2007 the US established the United
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States African Command (AFRICOM), a unified military command dedicated to US
security interests in Africa.31
The most ambitious of these projects was the EACTI. In the words of US
Department of Defense official Vincent Kern, the EACTI was “a $100 million, 15-month
Eastern Africa counter-terrorism initiative under which the United States is expanding
and accelerating counter-terrorism efforts with Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Uganda,
Tanzania, and Eritrea.”32 The EACTI was designed to build up East Africa’s coastal,
border, and airport/seaport security; assist in law enforcement training; establish a
terrorist tracking database; disrupt terrorist financing; and enhance community outreach
programs through education and aid projects.33
Additionally, the US sponsored the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program,
which funds and trains local police units in counterterrorism, and the Terrorist
Interdiction Program (TIP), which provides technical assistance and funding for updating
and modernizing technology at airports/seaports and borders.34 The US also provides
funds, advice, and technical assistance for airport security through the Safe Skies for
Africa Program, and for maritime and coastal security through the Africa Coastal/Border
Security Program.35 Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania each signed on to participate these
technical support and harmonization programs. They were all developed in the US, and
applied broadly to the region. In each East African state with a legislature, the US

31

Emerson, p. 56.
Vincent Kern, quoted in Haynes, p. 1338.
33
Haynes, p. 1338.
34
Beth Elise Whitaker, “Compliance Among Weak States: Africa and the Counter-Terrorism Regime,”
Review of International Studies, 36:3 (2010), p. 652.
35
Ploch, p. 25-26.
32

81

pushed for the passage of aggressive counterterrorism legislation, which succeeded in
Uganda and Tanzania, but, as will be explored below, was held up in Kenya.36
Several East African states were interested in joining the EACTI when it was
announced: “After 9/11, in common with its counterparts in Kenya and Uganda, the
Tanzanian government sought the West’s cooperation in fighting terrorism and took part
in the EACTI.”37 The governments of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda went so far in their
support of the US that they were counted among the US “coalition of the willing” during
Operation Iraqi Freedom.38
However, not all US efforts were received so positively. In testimony before the
House of Representatives, Princeton Lyman, a former US diplomat to several African
states, presented evidence that Kenyan civil society opposition to US intervention
prevented the ratification of an antiterrorism law:
The U.S. strongly backed anti-terrorism legislation being proposed by the
government of Kenya. But democracy advocates and civil society groups
in Kenya, fresh from having rid the country of one-party, one-man rule,
resisted, seeing in the legislation the seeds of new political oppression. In
addition, Kenyan Muslims argued that the legislation was anti-Muslim,
aggravating the alienation in that community that opened the door to
terrorist infiltration in the first place. The Kenyan Government finally
agreed to redraft the legislation.39
Kenya has a much stronger civil society on average than its neighbors,40 and that civil
society has been strongly opposed to US-backed counterterrorism legislation: “Strong
U.S. support for antiterrorist measures under consideration by the Kenyan Parliament has
also [along with US travel advisories for the region] provoked anger, particularly from
36
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civil libertarians…”41 In her review of compliance with the US-backed counterterrorism
regime in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, Beth Elise Whitaker finds that the less open
societies of Uganda and Tanzania42 were more compliant with the US-proposed
counterterrorism policies, laws, and support than Kenya.43
In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni has adopted the language of the “war on
terror” to apply to a variety of actors within Uganda. Museveni has used US
counterterrorism funding on major military offensives against the Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA), a rebel group known for kidnapping children and forcing them to become
child soldiers, and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a smaller group that included
dissident soldiers, Islamic extremists, and radical Hutu Rwandans.44 Museveni has also
used US-sponsored anti-terrorism legislation to “silence journalists and go after nonviolent political opponents, including labeling as a terrorist the main opposition candidate
in two recent presidential elections.”45 The US Department of State “has documented
serious human rights abuses and electoral irregularities in Uganda, and some observers
have expressed concern that Museveni’s cooperation on counterterrorism constrains
Western criticism for alleged political abuses.”46 The implication of this evidence is that
although the Ugandan government seems to be cooperating fully with US
counterterrorism strategy, Museveni may be taking what he can from the US and
adopting the rhetoric US policymakers want to hear, just as many states adopted
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anticommunist rhetoric during the Cold War to receive US assistance for internal
problems.47
In Tanzania, US proposals such as the ATA and TIP, as well as coastal,
border, and airport/seaport technical support and regulatory harmonization were
immediately accepted.48 The government of Tanzania, however, was adamantly
opposed to the US invasion of Iraq, and, as explored in more detail below, refused
to sign an Article 98 Agreement with the US, signifying its partial independence
from the US.49 US-supported and funded police and military units have been
accused of human rights abuses, spurring protests against the increases in funding
and subsequently impunity that came with new antiterrorism legislation.50 Outside
of the government, opposition to the US-sponsored 2002 antiterrorism law,
referred to as the “Ashcroft Law” after US Attorney General John Ashcroft, is
strong within civil society organizations and the Muslim community: “When the
FBI arrested two local Muslim leaders, activists organised a massive antiAmerican rally in June 2003; protestors carried signs that read ‘FBI get out’ and
‘Tanzania is not an American colony’.”51
The US strategy of cooperation with weak African states has tended to be heavyhanded at best. An example of that heavy-handedness was the Bush administration’s
Article 98 Agreement, a Bilateral Immunity Agreement to protect Americans from
prosecution before the International Criminal Court. The Bush administration pressured
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African states to sign the agreements, but Kenya and Tanzania (along with four other
African countries) refused to sign. In response the US suspended a significant amount of
aid to Kenya ($17 million over two years) and Tanzania.52
Following the 9/11 attacks, the US developed a counterterrorism strategy that
emphasized unilateralism, pre-emptive force, and a “with us or against us” hardline
perspective on alliances.53 Weak states, however, are not powerless in this interaction,
and as demonstrated above, they can take advantage of the additional economic, technical,
military, and political support made available when a strong state is pushing a policy
agenda. In the East African case, the US strategy of cooperation is closest to a (2), the
strong state dominates and the weak state concurs. In Tanzania and Kenya there was
vocal civil society objection to US-backed antiterrorism laws, objections which were
overridden in Tanzania, but effective in Kenya. In Uganda there was not much of a civil
society presence, and the antiterrorism laws were used by Museveni to further his own
political ends and to strike at groups that use terrorist tactics, like the LRA, but do not
have a global orientation and pose no direct threat to the US or its interests. There was
little weak state input in strategy formation, and the antiterrorism laws proposed in Kenya,
and Tanzania followed the 9/11 attacks in the US, not the 1998 attacks in East Africa,
indicating that they came from US pressure and did not originate domestically.54 That
said, in Uganda and Tanzania, the governments were able to maintain their own priorities
in the execution of the strategy, and all three states took advantage of the available
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funding and technical support made available through the US. While the civil societies
of East Africa protested, the governments, and in particular the security apparatuses,
concurred with the US dominated strategy of counterterrorism.

The European Union and East Africa

Europe has dealt with terrorist groups since long before this most recent evolution
of the tactic. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) struck against targets in the UK
throughout much of the twentieth century.55 Basque separatists in northern Spain used
terrorist tactics, and the group Basque Country and Freedom (Eta) has been classified by
Spain, the US and the EU as a terrorist organization.56 Italy and Germany both dealt with
persistent terrorist groups from the 1960s to the 1980s.57 These terrorist groups belong to
the old school of terrorism. They were insurgent groups, by and large, with limited
political support that used terrorism as a tactic to strike against their larger foes. Their
goals were limited in scope to achievable aims, and they could be, and were, negotiated
with.58
The 9/11 attacks were an alarm bell for Europe as well as the US, and they
reoriented EU foreign policy at a time when EU foreign security policy was just
55
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beginning to take shape. The first major action of the EU following 9/11 was to adopt the
Council Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (the Framework Decision), which
harmonized member states’ laws and regulations regarding terrorist acts.59 The EU also
created an EU Arrest Warrant to cut through jurisdictional problems across member
states,60 and made other changes within the EU to attempt to adapt to transnational
terrorism’s advantages over nation states:
The European Union, through its collective organs, and highlighting that
terrorism constitutes a serious threat to fundamental rights, democracy and
the rule of law responded immediately to the terrorist attacks of 11
September with the adoption of a series of measures for the
criminalisation of the commission and funding of terrorist activities and
the imposition of restrictions against individuals or groups involved in
such activities.”61
The EU approached terrorism as a law enforcement problem, not as a war, and that
approach applied both domestically and internationally. The EU defines the problem of
globally-oriented terrorist groups operating in East Africa as a homeland security issue.62
However, the EU sees that security issue as one that has many linked causes. In a
communication to the European Council on the EU strategy toward Africa,63 the
European Commission states that:
Cross-border dynamics, such as illegal migration and trafficking of arms,
drugs and refugee flows, are factors contributing to instability and tensions
that spread throughout the Horn of Africa and beyond, and could even
reach the EU. The Horn has come under increased international scrutiny
in the war against terrorism due to the spreading of religious extremism
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and ideological influences from neighboring sub-regions. Prevailing
insecurity in the region has also contributed to a culture of lawlessness,
banditry and warlordism. As a result the boundaries between political
conflict, criminality and terrorism tend to be blurred.64
This more multidimensional view of the problem predisposes the EU to search for
different kinds of solutions than the US did following 9/11. Additionally, the EU’s
general counterterrorism strategic commitment begins, “To combat terrorism globally
while respecting human rights [...]”65 The emphasis on human rights here originated in
the EU itself. It is important not to conflate the differences between EU and US
approaches to counterterrorism with differences in strategies of cooperation. Just because
the policies arrived at by the US and the EU are different does not necessarily mean that
the cooperative strategies are as well.
EU counterterrorism strategies in Africa focus on international laws and norms.66
The laws and regulations the EU refers to stem from UN resolutions following the 9/11
attacks, and the Framework Agreement.67 The norms have to do with human rights, but
also local ownership of foreign aid projects – “African solutions for African problems.”68
Thus, EU projects begin with the justification of “African ownership” or “multilateral
subsidiarity,” that is, either African states or regional organizations take action and lead
on issues, or, when that is not possible, the EU stands ready to offer support.69 Of course,
these rhetorical commitments do not always determine the reality of events.
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As stated above, the EU counterterrorism strategy has as a guiding principle the
norm of human rights. The EU fight for human rights has embraced the idea of human
security, or “the security of individuals and communities, expressed as both ‘freedom
from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’.”70 For the EU, the struggle against global terrorism
is inextricably bound to peace initiatives and economic and social development.
The international dimension of the EU’s counterterrorism strategy is defined
primarily in support of UN and regional efforts to harmonize counterterrorism
apparatuses and regulations (encompassing borders, airports, seaports, law enforcement,
intelligence sharing, and anti-radicalization communications) within “third countries,” or
states that lie outside of the EU.71 The strategy itself is divided into Prevent, Protect,
Pursue, and Respond,72 and the tools the EU uses to implement it are the European
Intelligence Agency,73 foreign aid, technical assistance, and support for peace processes
and development at the East African and Intergovernmental Authority on Development
(Greater Horn of Africa) regional level.74
EU counterterrorism initiatives in partnership with East African countries have
often taken the form of region to region cooperation, EU-African Union (AU), EU-EAC,
and EU-IGAD. Following 9/11, in response to the attacks and subsequent US initiatives,
many African states reinforced regional counterterrorism commitments, and the EU
moved to support those efforts:
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For their part, African States fortified their commitment to implement the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention to Combat Terrorism
that had been endorsed in 1999. They [the EU and the OAU] equally
decided to create a counter-terrorism centre in Algiers.”75
This center, named the African Centre for the Study and Research of Terrorism (ACSRT),
was formally established by the African Union in 2004, and “serves as the AU’s technical
arm on counter-terrorism-related issues and is responsible for evaluating the terrorist
threat in Africa and for promoting intra-African cooperation against terrorism.”76
The foundation for much of this subsequent EU-African cooperation was the 2000
Cotonou Agreement, an agreement meant to normalize trade relations between the
regions by subjecting them to WTO rules and codifying human rights and good
governance conditionality.77 Upon its revision in 2005, a number of counterterrorism
provisions were included in the Cotonou Partnership Agreement II, as was more money
for African, Caribbean, and Pacific states to increase their ability to execute those
provisions.78 One of the main features of the EU contribution to counterterrorism efforts
included in the revised Cotonou Agreement was technical assistance for African
countries attempting to bring their counterterrorism apparatuses up to spec.79
Another fundamental building block of the EU’s interactions with African nations
is the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership Agreement of 2007.80 The Africa-EU Strategic
Partnership Agreement calls for integrated cooperation – across the spheres of politics,
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economic development, and security. Through the framework established by the
Cotonou Agreement, the Revised Cotonou Agreement, and the Africa-EU Strategic
Partnership, the EU Political and Security Committee and the AU Peace and Security
Council have held regular meetings on security matters. These consultations have
focused on the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the Continental Early
Warning System, the African Standby Force, and the African Centre for the Study and
Research of Terrorism.81
Echoing the Colombian “Peace Laboratories,” African states, in partnership with
the EU, established the African Peace Facility.82 The Peace Facility was conceived in
2003 by the African Union, and it aims to address many of the underlying causes of
violent extremism, such as poverty, food scarcity, and poor governance.83 It also aims to
cut down on the proliferation of small arms and support African peacekeeping
operations.84 This is an explicitly African-led initiative, as the opening of the EU
resolution allocating funding to the project reads:
At the Summit of the African Union in Maputo from 4 to 12 July 2003, the
African Heads of State took a ‘Decision on the Establishment by the
European Union of a Peace Support Operation Facility for the African
Union’. In their decision, they specified that such a facility should be
financed from resources allocated to each of them under the existing
cooperation agreements with the European Union and be supplemented by
an equivalent amount of unallocated European Development Fund
resources.85
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It is important to emphasize that not only did the participating African governments
request the peace facility, a small part of an overall strategy to make the region more
peaceful and therefore less amenable to penetration by globally-oriented terrorist groups,
but they also specified to the EU how they would like it to be funded.
The Horn of Africa Initiative, targeting the IGAD countries of the greater Horn of
Africa region, “identified the problems originating from the Horn region and affecting the
EU and promised cooperation with IGAD to find a lasting solution in drugs, trafficking,
illegal immigrants, Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism and governance issues.”86 Here
again the EU and African states include counterterrorism in the context of other
transnational issues, along with root causes. This initiative was conceived of by the EU,
but, “The implementation of the strategy was launched jointly by the seven governments
in the Horn region (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda) and
EU in April 2007.”87 Also dealing with the Horn region, the Euromarfor, a European
maritime force, has taken part in US Operation Enduring Freedom – Horn of Africa, an
ongoing military operation led by the US Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa,
based in Djibouti and meant to fight globally-oriented terrorist groups and piracy.88 This
operation demonstrates how the EU often supports US counterterrorist operations, even
while working with African states on different counterterrorism measures.
In the main, EU counterterrorism efforts in East Africa are on a smaller scale than
those of the US. While the EU has worked to harmonize counterterrorism apparatuses
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throughout the continent, it has done so by offering financial and technical support, like
the US ATA and TIP initiatives, but without the domineering ‘stick’ of threats to aid cuts.
Additionally, I have found no evidence of the EU applying pressure on or advocating for
antiterrorism laws within East African states. When the EU makes trade agreements
conditional, it does so with on the condition of more stringent human rights guarantees or
more democratic societies, not counterterrorism.89
The counterterrorism projects and programs undertaken by the EU in cooperation
with African states tend towards the weak state leadership end of the strategies of
cooperation spectrum (5). The African Centre for the Study and Research of Terrorism
in Algiers was proposed and established by the AU with support and funding by the EU.
The Cotonou Partnership Agreements and the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership have
enabled close coordination between the EU and AU security committees. Regular highlevel meetings between the EU and the AU on security matters have allowed for feedback,
adaptations, and revisions in policies.
The Horn of Africa Initiative (HOAI) originated in the EU out of concern for how
problems in the Horn region were affecting EU security. The initial formulation of the
HOAI was problematic and widely criticized. IGAD’s website says of the HOAI, “The
Horn of Africa Initiative had indeed ignored the underlying causes such as abject poverty,
poor physical infrastructure communications and institutionalized dependency on food
aid.”90 However, following the Joint Assessment Missions of 2007 and 2009, the first of
which occurred six months after the HOAI was implemented by the seven IGAD states,
the EU and IGAD received feedback that led to changes in its implementation.
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“Consequently the focus of the strategy widened and the initiative became a regional
political partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa region.”91
While feedback and adaptation are not a part of the metric for classifying cases, the
degree of weak state input and high-level meetings indicated by such a dynamic change
in policy are, pointing towards strong and weak states participating equally (4).
The African Peace Facility, conceived and executed by the AU with technical and
financial support from the EU, is a solid example of weak state strategic leadership (5).
As described above, it is included in this consideration of the EU’s approach to
counterterrorism cooperation with East Africa because it is the primary mechanism by
which the EU has been contributing large sums towards the African Union Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) since 2007, fighting against al Shabaab.92 The African Union
requested that the EU become a partner in the establishment of a Peace Facility, and the
EU applied the requested funding in the manner in which it was requested. The EU
remained a partner, and in 2007 the AU and EU decided to “broaden the scope of the
African Peace Facility to cover conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilisation as well
as to accelerate decision-making and coordination processes.”93 This program allocated
100 million Euros to capacity building through the African Peace and Security
Architecture; 600 million Euros for Peace Support Operations, more than 440 million of
which went to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), combating al
Shabaab;94 15 million Euros for an Early Response Mechanism, a fund for responding
rapidly to disasters or crises; and 40 million Euros for contingencies. Of those sums, 740
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million Euros were spent from the Peace Facility’s establishment in 2004 to 2013, the
majority of which went to confronting al Shabaab in Somalia through AMISOM.95
A problem with this analysis is that it takes place at the regional unit of analysis.
While one of the assumptions of this thesis is that the EU can be treated as a state due to
its political, economic, and foreign policy coherence, I make no such assumptions about
the AU, IGAD, or the EAC. This problem is addressed by looking at the implementation
of agreements and participation in programs. Evaluations of these programs, like the
African Peace Facility, show a high degree of participation by the weak states. For
example, Kenya took advantage of an EU civilian training mission for coastal police
forces sponsored through the African Peace Facility in 2012.96 Uganda utilized the Early
Response Mechanism in response to incursions by the LRA.97 Uganda and Kenya have
both been involved in the HOAI, participating in projects to increase interconnectivity in
transport, energy and water resources for development.98 Tanzania has been involved in
many projects stemming from the Cotonou Partnership Agreements.99 The EU strategy
of cooperation towards the East African states is between equal participation by the
strong and weak state (4) and weak state strategic leadership (5). There is substantial
evidence of weak state leadership in terms of weak state input, maintenance of weak state
priorities in the final execution, and the implementation of and participation in the
agreements and programs. However, the strategy formation took place both in the strong
and weak states, through regional organizations, and through many high-level meetings.
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Finally, the EU had a significant amount of input on the counterterrorism strategies
employed, demonstrated by conditionality arrangements and human rights provisions.

Summary

Here again the approaches of the US and the EU are very different. Though the
US found some cooperative governments, the civil societies in Kenya and Tanzania
objected to the implementation of US formulated policies and programs. Charles Stith,
former US ambassador to Tanzania, urged the US to include more weak state input in its
approach to counterterrorism:
America cannot break the backs of organizations like al Qaeda without the
help of governments in Africa. While in Tanzania, I saw firsthand how
invaluable African intelligence assets were to the investigation of the U.S.
Embassy bombings in Africa. Without the help of the Tanzanians and the
South Africans, the United States would not have captured K. K.
Mohamed, the only person tried, convicted, and incarcerated for the Dar
[es Salaam] bombing.100
According to Rohan Gunaratna, “Until a month after US embassies in East Africa were
destroyed by the organization in 1998, the CIA did not even know the correct name of
Bin Laden’s group.”101 The EU approach, in contrast, has a much higher degree of weak
state input. There is no vocal opposition to EU policies, and East African states are eager
to participate in the regional policies and programs the EU has created in partnership with
African organizations like the AU and IGAD. In the following chapter I will analyze the
relative success of the policies and programs resulting from both the US and the EU’s
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strategies of cooperation with East Africa, attempting to conclude whether increased
weak state input leads to more successful policies against transnational threats.
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Chapter 6: Analysis – The Effect of Depth of Cooperation on the Success of a
Strategy

The essential question of this thesis deals with the utility of different strategies of
cooperation. Does deeper cooperation between weak and strong states tend to produce
policies and programs that are more successful at addressing transnational threats? Are
the strategies devised by weaker states more effective? Because of historically recent
changes in the international system that give threatening transnational forces an
advantage over states weak and strong, states must cooperate to confront them. The
depth of that cooperation, meaning the degree to which the weak state is involved, is a
factor that dramatically affects the policies and programs that are the outcome of that
cooperation.
This chapter will examine the degree of success each of the policies and programs
discussed in the cases achieved. It will begin with an evaluation of the success of the US
followed by the EU approach to transnational crime in Colombia. Next it will do the
same for US and EU approaches to terrorism in East Africa. To measure the success of
the policies and programs undertaken to address the problem of transnational crime, I will
look at how the initiatives undertaken through the cooperation between the US/EU and
Colombia in Plan Colombia affected the rate of drug-related crime, and the amount of
drugs entering the US/EU. For terrorism success will be measured by a decline in the
rate of terrorist attacks in and originating from East African states following the
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introduction of the policies and programs resulting from US and EU cooperation with
those states.

Transnational Crime

Success against transnational crime, meaning, in this study, drug trafficking,
presents a difficult challenge for measurement. Governments and news organizations
tend to focus on the amount of land used for the production of illicit drugs,1 but because
of the balloon effect, wherein drug production and trafficking routes tend to respond to
increased pressure by shifting to another location, this alone is not a good measure.
When used as part of a composite measure, however, it can help to create an accurate
picture of the share of illicit drugs flowing into a sink state from a specific source state,
which this thesis will use as one part of the metric of success for strong and weak states
against transnational crime. The first task of this analysis of the success of transnational
crime is to measure the amount of cocaine, because of the focus in Colombia on cocaine,
that flows into the US and the EU. Because Colombia has accounted for the production
of 68 percent of the world’s cocaine,2 I expect to see the flow of cocaine into the US and
EU decrease substantially if the strategy worked. A reliable estimate of the flow of
cocaine into a state is the price of cocaine by purity. This estimate is based on the
principle of supply and demand and can tell us if the supply of the drug into the US or
EU has been disrupted causing a surge in prices, or if supply has become more plentiful
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causing a drop in prices. The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
provides street cocaine prices by purity level going back to 1990.3 Figure 6.1 shows that
the price of cocaine has declined from 1990 to 2010, with occasional spikes, one of
which occurred immediately following the introduction of Plan Colombia and the EU
Peace Plan.
Figure 6. 1: Price of Cocaine in the US (per Gram)

Source: World Drug Report 2012, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, New York: United
Nations Publication, web, accessed 4/23/14, <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-andanalysis/WDR-2012.html>, (2012).
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(2012).

100

The 2001 spike, up to $201/gram in the US, correlates with a large reduction in
the production of coca bush in Colombia from 163,300 hectares in 2000 to 144,800
hectares in 2001. Figure 6.2, below, shows that while in the early 1990s there was a
strong negative correlation between Colombian cocaine production and US prices (low
production in Colombia occurred at the same time as high prices in the US), after 2001
things get murky.
Figure 6. 2: Price in the US vs. Production in Colombia
Solid Line = US Price/Gram
Dashed Line = Colombia Production

Sources: World Drug Report 2005, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, web, accessed
4/20/2014, <www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2005.html>, (2005) p. 207; and World
Drug Report 2012, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, New York: United Nations
Publication, web, accessed 4/23/14, <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR2012.html>, (2012).

101

The price in the US falls, indicating either an increase in supply or a decrease in demand,
at the same time as production in Colombia falls. According to the World Drug Report,
demand in the US remained stable and insatiable until 2006,4 so supply during this period
must have risen. The best explanation for this is the balloon effect. As counternarcotics
forces applied pressure to Colombian producers, the source of supply went elsewhere.
Colombian production and US prices both remained relatively low from 2002 to 2007,
prices remaining between their lowest point at $129/gram in 2007 and $155 in 2003,5 and
production between 78,000 and 102,000 hectares of coca bush.6 From 2008 to 2009,
prices rose in line with a reduction in acreage dedicated to the cultivation of coca bush,
showing that by that time the supply of US cocaine was again tied to Colombia, and a
reduction there meant a shortage in the US, driving up prices to their highest point since
2001. By 2010, however, prices seemed to be falling slightly while acreage declined,
most likely echoing the trend from 2002 to 2007 of transnational criminal organizations
(TCOs) adapting and working around supply and transit-targeting programs.
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Figure 6. 3: Price of Cocaine in the EU (per Gram)

Source: World Drug Report 2012, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, New York: United
Nations Publication, web, accessed 4/23/14, <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-andanalysis/WDR-2012.html>, (2012).

Demand has not been as high for cocaine in the EU as it was in the US, so the
price of cocaine was comparatively lower there to begin with. Figure 6.3 shows EU
prices for cocaine from 1990-2010. The price in the EU begins and ends lower than in
the US, and this is explained by lower demand. In the EU, estimates of cocaine users in
2004 were at just above 3.25 million, and at the same time in North America, primarily
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the US, users were at around 6.5 million.7 Demand in the US dropped significantly
following 2006, so by 2011 users were estimated to be at around 4.75 million, while in
Western Europe demand had increased to about 4 million users by that time.8
Interestingly, Figure 6.3 shows low stable prices in the EU at the same time that Figure
6.1 shows a spike in US prices (2001). Though the US spike in 2001 was short lived and
prices plummeted to a new low the following year, there was only a very slight rise in
price in the EU. As the effects of Plan Colombia took hold, prices in the US rose from
$162/gram in 1999 to $204/gram in 2001, before dropping again to $143/gram in 2002.
In the EU, on the other hand, prices dropped from $88/gram in 1999 to $70/gram in 2000,
then rose slightly to $74/gram in 2001. Whatever temporary success was achieved by the
implementation of Plan Colombia between 2000 and 2001 did not translate into a
significant drop in prices (hence, supply) for the EU at the same time.
Prices in European states dropped steadily in the 1990s before bottoming out in
2000. They really started to pick up again in 2003, going from $70/gram in 2000 to
$84/gram in 2003. In 2008 the post-2000 price peaked at $94, before it began to decline
again. As described above, cocaine use in the EU gained approximately 1.5 million users
between 2003 and 2011, which explains some of the price increase from 2003 to 2008,
but then prices began to fall again, despite a larger market. This indicates that supply
grew faster than demand from 2008 to 2010, dropping the price.
Judging by prices, drug flows into the US were somewhat impacted, and in the
EU not substantially impacted by Plan Colombia and the Peace Process. Success in
stopping cocaine from entering the US was achieved briefly in 2001, when prices
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climbed 126 percent, indicating a blow had been struck against US cocaine supply.
However, despite continued declines in hectares of land dedicated to the production of
coca, from 163,300 in 2000 to 80,000 in 2004, the supply of coca into the US rebounded
in 2002, demonstrated by the steep price drop from 2001 to 2002, and an average decline
up to 2007. This does not exactly mean that Plan Colombia has not been somewhat
successful, from a Colombian point of view at least. Production in Colombia has
continued to decline (except for 2007) so the US market is probably being supplied from
elsewhere. In the EU, prices shifted less dramatically as a whole, indicating a market less
responsive to shifts in supply due to lower demand. When cocaine flow to the US was
seriously impacted by US defoliation and interdiction efforts associated with Plan
Colombia, I expected prices per gram in the EU to either spike as well, demonstrating a
shortage in the supply of cocaine for the EU as well as the US, or plummet,
demonstrating that TCOs were avoiding the US market and going elsewhere due to fear
of US interdiction efforts. Instead the price in the EU stayed between $70 and $74/gram
from 2000 to 2002, indicating that the EU cocaine market was not significantly impacted
by either Plan Colombia, or the EU efforts at crop reduction. The primary determinant of
EU prices seems to be its own climbing demand, unless estimates are wrong and Europe
has a greater diversity of producers. This seems unlikely because of Europe’s geographic
distance from cocaine producing countries compared to the US. If spikes in prices in the
US are caused by sudden drops in Colombian supply, and assuming geographic
proximity makes transit cheaper, then one must assume that the more expensive transit to
the EU would make the EU market even more vulnerable to fluctuations in Colombian
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production if they had a similarly high demand, even if, as is surely the case for both the
US and the EU, their supply comes from several states.
The second factor impacting the success of the venture is on the weak state side.
The main problem for Colombia was not the flow of drugs into the US and the EU, but
instead the high rates of violence linked to the drug trade. Originally, President Pastrana
asked the world for the tools to find peace against the various rebel groups profiting from
the drug trade, economic stability to provide other options for farmers, and institutional
strength to fight corruption.9 Did the policies and programs adopted by the US and the
EU weaken the grip of TCOs in Colombia, at least in terms of levels of violence? To
begin, I will focus on the US impact. At this level the effects of the policies implemented
by the two strong states are easier to separate, as the EU effects are sure to be
concentrated geographically near their Peace Laboratories, which were set up near highcoca producing areas.10 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) offers
the public a comprehensive database that includes the rates of violent crime linked to the
production and trafficking of illicit drugs.11
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Figure 6. 4: Total Homicides (solid line) and Homicides Linked to Organized Crime (dashed line) in
Colombia, 2005-2011

Source: “Global Study on Homicide, Data” UNODC Homicide Statistics 2013, United Nations Office
on Drugs and Crime, web, accessed 5/1/2014, <https://www.unodc.org/gsh/en/data.html>, (2013).

The share of homicides directly attributed to organized criminal groups is a small
percentage of total homicides. Figure 6.4 shows that the two rates vary together, and
therefore fluctuations in the overall homicide rate are an accurate proxy of the overall
trends in transnational crime-related violence in Colombia. Because data are not
available on organized crime before 2005, I am including this figure to support the proxy
use of earlier data in Figure 6.5.
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Figure 6. 5: Colombia’s Homicide Rate from 1998-2012

Source: “Homicide Counts and Rates, Time Series 2000-2012,” UNODC Homicide Statistics 2013,
Global Study on Homicide, web, accessed 5/1/2014, <http://www.unodc.org/gsh/en/data.html>, (2014).

Figure 6.5 displays the homicide rate per 100,000 for Colombia since the late 1990s. The
rate peaks in 2002 at 70.2 per 100,000 population, before declining rapidly to just above
30 per 100,000 population in 2012. The rise from 60 to 70 homicides per 100,000
population corresponds with the introduction of Plan Colombia. However, the overall
trend shows that from 2002 to 2012, levels of violence in Colombia have declined
significantly as the political situation has improved. A map in the UNODC’s publication,
“Violence, Crime and Illegal Arms Trafficking in Colombia,” clarifies those numbers by
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illustrating where in Colombia the violence continues to exceed the national rate. The
homicide rates used in the publication are for 2005, when Colombia’s homicide rate had
dropped to 39.6/100,000. By comparison, the US homicide rate at that time was
5.6/100,000.12 The map shows that violence was worst in the center of the country, near
urban areas or places high in resources. However, the map is remarkably clear in
Magdalena Medio, near the north of the country, where the first EU peace laboratory
stands.13 Magdalena Medio was one of the most violent areas of Colombia, according to
the World Bank, until the Peace Laboratory took root.14

12

“Intentional homicide, count and rate per 100,000 population (1995-2011),” (2014).
“Violence, Crime and Illegal Arms Trafficking in Colombia,” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime,
web, accessed 4/20/14, <https://www.unodc.org/pdf/Colombia_Dec06_en.pdf>, (2006).
14
World Bank, p. 1.
13
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Figure 6. 6: Homicide Rate (as in Figure 6.5) vs. Battle Related Deaths (new line)15 in Colombia

Soruce: “Homicide Counts and Rates, Time Series 2000-2012,” UNODC Homicide Statistics 2013,
Global Study on Homicide, web, accessed 5/1/2014, <http://www.unodc.org/gsh/en/data.html>, (2014);
and “UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2013, 1989-2012,” Uppsala Conflict Data Program,
web, accessed 4/29/14, <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_battlerelated_deaths_dataset/>, (2013).

Figure 6.6 seems counterintuitive at first. Here I have juxtaposed the homicide
rate, shown in Figure 6.5, with battle-related deaths from clashes between the
government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and

15

“UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2013, 1989-2012,” Uppsala Conflict Data Program, web,
accessed 4/29/14, <http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_battle-related_deaths_dataset/>,
(2013).
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the National Liberation Army (ELN).16 In this chart it looks like the homicide rate and
battle-related deaths were closely entwined until 2004, when the number of battle-related
deaths rocketed upwards, from a low of 500 in 2003 to a peak of 1,389 in 2005. From
those highs it dropped again, dramatically, to 244 in 2008, popped up to around 400 in
2010, and declined for 2011 and 2012 to near 200. The point of showing battle-related
deaths is to trace the levels of violence in Colombian society. Both the FARC and the
ELN, as discussed in the case study in chapter 4, have converted coca production into a
source of revenue. The first escalation in violence corresponded to the initial influx of
military aid and weaponry from Plan Colombia in early 2001.17 The second
corresponded to the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) used by President Bush to re-brand
the drug war as a part of the broader war on terror, and the FARC as a narco-terrorist
group.18 The ARI funding and arms was dispersed in 2003, and the peak of the
government’s battles with the rebels followed shortly after, in 2005. After this escalation,
however, battle-related deaths declined sharply, dropping to a stable range of between
200 and 400 deaths a year between 2007 and 2012. This decline, and the decline in the
homicide rate for the same time, represented a significant positive development for
Colombia.
Can the trend of decreasing levels of violence from 2005 to 2012 be ascribed to
the support offered the Colombian government through Plan Colombia and the ARI?
The declining levels of violence in Colombia do correlate with the influx of funding for

16

Ibid.
Nina M. Serfino, “Colombia: Summary and Tables on U.S. Assistance, FY1989-FY2003,”
Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, RS21213 (2002), p. 2.
18
K. Larry Storrs and Connie Veillette, “Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2003 Supplemental and
FY2004 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors,” Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress,
RL32021 (2003), pp. 1-2.
17
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Colombia’s security forces included in US aid, strengthening the hand of the Colombian
government and possibly enabling it to break the stalemate with the FARC, ELN, and
AUC. However, they also correlate with the EU’s Peace Process. This data does not
show causation, and it is impossible to disentangle the effects of the two large-scale aid
projects in this case, but it does seem to indicate that the grasp of transnational crime has
been weakened in Colombia following the implementation of these programs and policies.
The results of the EU’s actions were mixed. As demonstrated above, the price of
cocaine per gram in the EU did not rise significantly following the implementation of EU
alternative development and crop substitution programs, parts of the Peace Process. The
EU did not manage to reduce the flow of drugs into its member states by any significant
amount. However, the Magdalena Medio Peace Laboratory seems to have succeeded in
reducing levels of violence in the region. Additionally, EU good offices and mediation
were available when the Colombian government and FARC agreed to come to the table,
though they were rarely used. The declining homicide rate at the national level, and the
decrease in battle-related deaths, are both things that the EU was explicitly working
towards in its Peace Plan.
According to the factors taken into account in this analysis, the implementation of
Plan Colombia was followed by decreased levels of violence (after initial spikes) and
decreased overall cocaine production in Colombia. These constitute successes for Plan
Colombia, and for the state of Colombia. Were the operations of TCOs, which profited
from Colombian supply, disrupted by Plan Colombia and its successor, the ARI?
Judging from how quickly cocaine prices in the US dropped following their spike at the
outset of the implementation of Plan Colombia, TCOs were impacted for only a short
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time. If the goals of Plan Colombia were to stabilize Colombia and reduce cocaine
production there, it must be judged a success based on the analysis above. If it was
meant to confront transnational crime and to prevent the flow of cocaine into the US in a
sustained way, it seems to have had little impact for all of the reasons discussed in
chapter three. When pressure was applied in Colombia, TCOs worked around the
measures meant to stop them and found other sources of cocaine.
Which strategy of cooperation led to more successful outcomes? From the
analysis above, it would seem that the outcomes were moderately successful regardless of
the strategy of cooperation. This case does not support my hypothesis a great deal. The
degree of weak state input in the formulation of policies to confront transnational threats
was not a crucial factor that determined success, although the EU approach did lead to
successful outcomes in key social areas. The EU approach which took in more weak
state input led to policies and programs that decreased levels of violence, which is
favorable in a normative sense.

Global Terrorism

Terrorist groups have adapted just as quickly to the changing world as TCOs,
making use of state borders, weak state institutions, and a non-hierarchical network
structure to evade capture, grow their organizations, and strike at strong state targets. In
order to capture how the policies and programs created through the cooperation of weak
and strong states fare against terrorist groups, I will examine the number of terrorist
incidents that occurred following the implementation of the policy, allowing for a year of
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lag time for the policy to begin having an effect. Measuring the rise and fall of terrorist
acts does not perfectly predict the increase and decline of the strength of a particular
globally-oriented terrorist group. It does, however, make for a serviceable rough-cut
glance at the issue. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) is a publicly-available
database that counts and codes incidents of terrorism by perpetrator, incident type, and
place.19
Figure 6. 7: Terrorist Incidents 1995-2012 in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania

Source: “National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START),”
Global Terrorism Database [Data file], web, accessed 4/29/14, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>,
(2012).
19

“Overview of the GTD,” Global Terrorism Database, Web, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/about/>,
accessed 2/26/14 (December 2013).
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Figure 6.7 draws from the GTD to analyze terrorist incidents by year from 1995-2012 in
Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. It shows that though terrorist incidents were few and held
steady in the region from 2001 to 2006, they nearly doubled their former peak from 2010
to 2012. Most of the attacks from 2010 to 2012 took place in Kenya and were carried out
by the Somalia-based terrorist group with strong ties to al Qaeda, al Shabaab. Tanzania
and Uganda were much less affected by terrorism. In fact, extending the timeline back to
the late 1990s, when al Qaeda was first establishing a foothold in the region, there are
very few incidents, save the large scale attacks discussed in chapter five in Dar es Salaam
and Mombasa. The GTD recorded three total terrorist incidents in Tanzania and Uganda,
two in Uganda that occurred on the same day in 2010 and the Dar es Salaam bombing in
Tanzania, in the period between 1995 and 2012.20 As discussed in chapter five, al Qaeda,
al Shabaab, and Ittihad al-Islamiya (AIAI) are the three organizations this analysis covers
because of their activities in the region, global orientation, and maximalist goals. Figure
6.7 shows that, despite the introduction of antiterrorist measures in the region, incidents
perpetrated by globally-oriented terrorist groups have increased.
Figure 6.8 looks at the frequency of terrorist incidents perpetrated by al Qaeda, al
Shabaab, and AIAI, which operate in and draw strength from the East African region,
both in the region and abroad, in an effort to judge the strength of those organizations
following the implementation of the policies discussed in chapter five.

20

“National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START),” Global
Terrorism Database [Data file], web, accessed 4/29/14, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>, (2012).
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Figure 6. 8: Terrorist Incidents 1995-2012 Perpetrated by Groups Linked to East Africa

Source: “National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START),”
Global Terrorism Database [Data file], web, accessed 4/29/14, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>, (2012).

Figure 6.8 shows that, like the frequency of incidents within East Africa, the frequency of
incidents by groups linked to the region (that is, both within the region and abroad) has
escalated since the introduction of the policies and programs meant to prevent them.
Unfortunately, Figure 6.8 most likely underestimates the strength of these organizations.
As cautioned in chapter five, these organizations share information, training, and
equipment with other iterations of al Qaeda and with ideological brethren, so their impact
may be felt in other ways than just attributed attacks, like sheltering bomb-makers or
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recruiting. 21 The main takeaway from Figures 6.7 and 6.8 is that the rate of terrorist
incidents in and from groups linked to the East African region have not decreased
despite interventions by the US and the EU.
Table 6. 1: Terrorist Incidents by Country, 1995-2005 and 2006-201222
1995-2005 Terrorist Incidents by

Count

2006-2012 Terrorist Incidents by

Country

Country

Count

Country
International Waters

1

Tanzania

1

Tunisia

1

Yemen

1

Ethiopia

2

Indonesia

2

Iraq

2

Kenya

2

Somalia

2

United States

4

Turkey

5

Pakistan

13

Afghanistan

26

Total

62

Afghanistan

1

Mali

1

Turkey

1

West Bank and

1

Gaza Strip
Country

Ethiopia

2

Uganda

2

Pakistan

7

Kenya

87

Somalia

428

Total

530

Source: “National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START),”
Global Terrorism Database [Data file], web, accessed 4/29/14, <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd>, (2012).

If Somalia is included in the analysis, as shown in Table 6.1, incidents of terrorism
committed by the organizations included in this case have grown considerably since 2006.
Seven out of 62 incidents, or just over eleven percent of the incidents perpetrated by

21

Adam Nossiter and David Kirkpatrick, “Abduction of Girls an Act Not Even Al Qaeda Can Condone,”
New York Times, web, accessed 5/9/2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/08/world/africa/abductionof-girls-an-act-not-even-al-qaeda-can-condone.html?ref=africa&_r=0>, (2014). While this article details
the schism currently opening between the Nigerian group Boko Haram and al Qaeda affiliated groups, it
also illustrates how following a crackdown by the Nigerian government that decimated the group, its
members were taken in by al Qaeda affiliated organizations all over Africa, including al Shabaab.
22
Bolded states are part of the Greater Horn of Africa region, specified above in chapter 5.
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groups linked to East Africa, occurred in the region from 1995-2005. From 2006-2012,
519 of 530 incidents, or nearly 98 percent, occurred in the region.
As can be seen in the table, incidents of terrorism in Kenya rose substantially after
2006. This resulted from contagion from Somalia’s instability, with Kenya sending
troops to Somalia in 2011. Kenya has been slow to react to terrorism: of the East African
countries, it alone did not pass an antiterrorism law. According to US congressional
testimony, the Kenyan antiterrorism legislation was adamantly opposed by democracy
advocates and civil society groups in Kenya who viewed the law as amenable to abuse as
an instrument of political oppression, and as a vehicle of US intervention in Kenyan
domestic affairs.23 This analysis tracks with the sentiment expressed in Tanzanian civil
society, where those opposed to the antiterrorism law referred to it as the “Ashcroft
Law,” after US Attorney General John Ashcroft.24 Indeed, one of the primary motivating
factors of opposition to the antiterrorism law was the perception in Kenyan civil society
of the law as originating externally, that is, imposed by the US.25 Thus, US pressure may
have had the inadvertent effect of hindering counterterrorist action in Kenya.
The primary goals of the US and EU attempts to harmonize East African
transportation security, through programs like the US-sponsored Anti-Terrorism
Assistance (ATA) Program, Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP), Safe Skies for Africa
Program, and Africa Coastal/Border Security Program, all discussed in more detail in
chapter five, are to prevent the kind of hijacking that occurred on 9/11, and to prevent
23

Princeton N. Lyman, “The Terrorist Threat in Africa,” testimony before the House Committee on
International Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Hearing on “Fighting Terrorism in Africa,” Washington,
D.C. (2004).
24
Beth Elise Whitaker, “Compliance Among Weak States: Africa and the Counter-Terrorism Regime,”
Review of International Studies, 36:3 (2010), p. 657
25
The main opposition party in Kenya, Kanu, called the antiterrorism bill a, “step along the way to the
setting up of a US military base in Kenya,” quoted in “Kenya’s Terror Bill Rejected,” BBC News, web,
accessed 4/20/2014, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3069211.stm>, (2003).
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Weapon of Mass Destruction being used for acts of terrorism.26 Because there were no
hijackings specifically involving those states and the groups in this study either before or
after the implementation of those programs, it is impossible to say based on this data
whether the programs have had an effect on terrorism. On the other hand, since 9/11
there were two incidents involving al Shabaab in nearby Somalia; according to the Global
Terrorism Database, neither involved fatalities.
There have been no terrorist WMD attacks in the intervening years. The goals of
the softer programs pushed by the US and the EU to harmonize security regulations for
travel were met, for the most part, although we cannot say if there would have been
terrorist incidents without these programs inasmuch as there were no incidents before
9/11. It is important to note that these programs, though developed in the strong state,
did not prompt protests by civil society organizations and were all domesticated by the
weak state.
Where the EU’s policies diverge from the US’s are in the former’s more regional
approach and its focus on what it believes to be the roots of the problem – economic and
social development and human rights. The African Peace Facility has aspects that have
been enacted too recently to judge them, such as the coastal policing training for Kenya
that began in 2012. That facility has been contributing large sums towards the African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) since 2007, 27 but AU forces with EU support
have not made much headway stabilizing Somalia or reducing terrorist incidents.

26

Lauren Ploch, “Countering Terrorism in East Africa,” Congressional Research Service, R41473 (2010),
pp. 25-26.
27
A total of 441.4 million Euro from 2007 to 2012, “African Peace Facility Annual Report 2012,”
European Commission, Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid, (2012), p. 19.
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Finally, economic and social development are defined by the EU as important
aspects of their approach to fighting terrorism. The Horn of Africa Initiative and the
Cotonou Partnership Agreements are included in the EU’s counterterrorism framework.28
In addition to the conditionality built into the 2005 revisions of the agreement, the EU
sought to decrease terrorism by increasing trade with the region. Significantly, EUTanzania trade has grown by an average of 8.9 percent for imports into the EU and five
percent for exports from 2008-2012. The EU is one of Tanzania’s top three trading
partners, along with China and India.29 Partly as a result of this, Tanzania’s Gross
National Income Purchasing Power Parity (GNI PPP) has grown from $1,280 (current
USD) in 2008 to $1,560 in 2012, registering a nearly seven percent annual increase in
GDP.30 Both Kenya and Uganda have similarly increased trade with the EU from 2008
to 2012, and the EU is high on both of their lists of top trading partners.31 Kenya has
grown during the time period of 2008 to 2012, though more slowly than Tanzania.32
Uganda saw nine percent annual growth in GDP in 2008, but quickly dropped back down
to seven and six percent and then fell precipitously in 2012 to three percent as the global
recession hit.33 Thus, until recently, all three states experienced economic growth at the
same time as they increased trade with the EU, one of their most important trading

28

“The Cotonou Agreement,” Development and Cooperation, European Comission, web, accessed
4/23/2014, <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/cotonou-agreement/index_en.htm>, (2012).
29
“European Union, Trade in Goods with Tanzania,” Directorate-General for Trade, The European
Commission, (2013), pp. 2, 9.
30
“Tanzania: World Development Indicators,” World DataBank, The World Bank, web, accessed
4/30/2014, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx>, (2014).
31
“European Union, Trade in Goods with Kenya,” Directorate-General for Trade, The European
Commission, (2013), pp. 2, 9; and “European Union, Trade in Goods with Uganda,” Directorate-General
for Trade, The European Commission, (2013), pp. 2, 9. The EU is Uganda’s most important trading partner
in both imports and exports (p. 9).
32
“Kenya: World Development Indicators,” World DataBank, The World Bank, web, accessed 4/30/2014,
<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx>, (2014).
33
“Uganda: World Development Indicators,” World DataBank, The World Bank, web, accessed 4/30/2014,
<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx>, (2014).
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partners. Did this economic growth correlate with falling rates of terrorist violence? If it
did, we would expect the state with the highest GNI PPP to have the least terrorism.
World Bank data shows that Kenya has the highest GNI PPP of the three, and yet has the
highest frequency of terrorist incidents. 34 This indicates that increased trade and
economic growth are not, by themselves, effective against terrorism.

Summary

My hypothesis posited that strong states would more effectively confront
transnational threats if they cooperated with weak states; especially if they let weak states
lead in developing strategies to deal with transnational threats. The results, however, are
more complicated. The US-formulated Plan Colombia was an example of strong state
imposition, and although it succeeded in lowering drug production in Colombia, it failed
to stem the flow of cocaine into the US for longer than a year. The implementation of the
US plan corresponded with temporarily higher homicide rates and an escalation in the
war with the FARC, but was followed by a drastic decline in the levels of violence there.
The EU’s impact on Colombia in the region of the Peace Laboratory, Magdalena Medio,
was that homicide rates dropped from far above the national average to well below.
While it is hard here to attribute causation in a region affected by the broader national
environment, we can at least say that EU support for the Peace Laboratory coincided with
decreased rates of violence. Cocaine continued to flow into the EU at a comparatively

34

“Kenya: World Development Indicators,” (2014); “Tanzania: World Development Indicators,” (2014);
and “Uganda: World Development Indicators,” (2014).
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steady rate, showing that neither the US nor the EU approaches addressed the TCOs
profiting by the production, trafficking, and sale of cocaine.
In East Africa, the US has tended to impose strategies to confront terrorism, but
the weak states there concurred with those strategies and sought to make the most out of
them. In the states that concurred strongest with the US approach, the US policies were
implemented immediately, with little measurable effect one way or the other. In Kenya
the heavy-handed US approach, in part, caused the failure of the implementation of the
antiterrorism law. The EU’s deeper cooperation with East African states, nearly to the
point of weak state strategic leadership, met with no unqualified successes in confronting
globally-oriented terrorist groups there. On the other hand, it met with fewer outright
failures than the US did. In each case, no policy was successful in addressing
transnational threats. The EU approach, however, seems to have failed the least simply
because it was based on social and economic cooperation rather than military strategies.
My initial hypothesis was not proven by the cases explored here. It does not seem that
allowing weak states to take the lead necessarily increases the probability of success of
the policies adopted to confront transnational threats.
The predictions extrapolated from hegemonic stability theory fared no better than
my own. Hegemonic stability theory is the realist theory that argues that the state with a
preponderance of power will act to stabilize the international system by taking the lead
and imposing its strategies on weaker states, shaping the system to facilitate and
perpetuate its hegemony.35 The logical extension of this theory is the prediction that
strong states, especially hegemonic states like the US, would lead the world in
developing strategies to confront transnational threats, and strong state imposition of
35

John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W.W. Norton (2001), p. 34.
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those strategies would beget more successful policies and programs than weak state
strategic leadership. However, the evidence provided in the analysis above shows that a
lack of weak state input has little demonstrable impact on the probability of success.
The generalizability of these results may be limited, but it opens the door to
further research. Does geographic proximity of strong state to weak state affect the
effectiveness of the cooperatively formed policies and programs? Does ideological
affinity between governments? Does the magnitude of the policy or program, in terms of
financial or military commitments? Does the inclusion of military components? Does
the degree of violence in the weak state? Are some transnational threats more amenable
to weak state leadership than others? The evidence above suggests that increased weak
state input might correlate with the formulation of policies that result in less civil unrest
in the weak state (for example: temporary spikes in levels of violence in the Colombian
case, domestic opposition in the Kenyan case, and domestic antiterrorism laws in Uganda
and Tanzania that have been used to stifle political dissent). Is there a causal link here, or
is this coincidental? More research is necessary to answer these questions.
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